Re: WGLC BFD Authentication Drafts

Greg Mirsky <gregimirsky@gmail.com> Mon, 09 April 2018 19:40 UTC

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From: Greg Mirsky <gregimirsky@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 09 Apr 2018 12:39:59 -0700
Message-ID: <CA+RyBmVXzaHo1_AjkuYdGCJ2MUOPdobXS8awA0Fn9O8+JMFVQQ@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: WGLC BFD Authentication Drafts
To: Ashesh Mishra <mishra.ashesh@outlook.com>
Cc: Jeffrey Haas <jhaas@pfrc.org>, "rtg-bfd@ietf.org" <rtg-bfd@ietf.org>
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Hi Ashesh,
thank you for your response to my questions. I think I need some more of
your help to locate the text in RFC 5880 that, as you've stated, mandates
that the single failure to authenticate a BFD control packet in Up
state triggers the transition to Down state. I only see section 6.7 that
describes authentication validation and when the received control packet
must be discarded because of validation failure and the following text:
      If the A bit is set, the packet MUST be authenticated under the
      rules of section 6.7, based on the authentication type in use
      (bfd.AuthType).  This may cause the packet to be discarded.
But I don't find any text that states that if authentication is in use,
then Detect Time calculated regardless of the value of the Detect Mult
field. Perhaps I will extend the description of the scenario:

   - authentication is in use and every, for example, the fourth packet to
   be authenticated, i.e. three control packets with NULL Auth TLV followed by
   "real" authenticated control packet;
   - initial packets, three-way handshake, pass authentication verification
   and the session is Up;
   - at some point, the verification of the "real" authenticated packets
   fails and it is discarded;
   - packets with NUL Auth TLV pass the validation.

Appreciate your consideration and help.

Regards,
Greg

On Mon, Apr 9, 2018 at 10:51 AM, Ashesh Mishra <mishra.ashesh@outlook.com>
wrote:

> Hi Greg,
>
>
>
> What I meant to say was that the state machine remains the same as in the
> case of 5880 authentication. If an authentication frame fails validation
> then the session goes down regardless of good OPER-UP frames
> (authentication or normal) before or after that frame. Since the behavior
> in 5880 does not require any more than 1 frame to fail validation, the
> mechanism works as-is in the new proposal. Once the session is down, all
> frames need to be authenticated to bring the session up so again, the
> session can’t come back up just because the frame that failed validation is
> followed by a stream of unauthenticated frames.
>
>
>
> Hope that addresses the gap that you presented.
>
>
>
> Ashesh
>
>
>
> *From: *Greg Mirsky <gregimirsky@gmail.com>
> *Date: *Tuesday, April 3, 2018 at 8:35 PM
>
> *To: *Ashesh Mishra <mishra.ashesh@outlook.com>
> *Cc: *Jeffrey Haas <jhaas@pfrc.org>, "rtg-bfd@ietf.org" <rtg-bfd@ietf.org>
> *Subject: *Re: WGLC BFD Authentication Drafts
>
>
>
> Hi Asheh,
>
> thank you for the detailed response to my questions and consideration of
> my comments.
>
> I think I cannot agree that the BFD state machine remains unchanged if
> optimized BFD authentication is in periodic mode. Let's consider case when
> only every 5th BFD control packet is authenticated when the session is in
> Up state. What happens if from some moment every authenticated packet fails
> to be validated? Would the session go to Down state? But all
> unauthenticated BFD control packets pass the validation check and since
> only one packet seems to miss validation the session, if the state machine
> remains unchanged, will stay Up.
>
>
>
> Do you see this as plausible scenario?
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Greg
>
>
>
> On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 11:03 AM, Ashesh Mishra <mishra.ashesh@outlook.com>
> wrote:
>
> Thanks for the clarification, Greg.
>
>
>
> Here are my thoughts on the issues:
>
>
>
> *I'd break it into couple more specific questions: *
>
> ·         *can the periodic Optimized Authentication mode be used without
> authorization o state changes;*
>
> ·         *if the answer to the previous question "yes", then when the
> first authorized BFD control packet must be transmitted by the system;*
>
> ·         *does the BFD state machine (section 6.2 RFC 5880) changes
> resulting from introduction of periodic optimized authentication mode;*
>
> *[AM] The optimized authentication can be used without state changes and
> the first auth packet will be the DOWN state frame to kick-off the session
> negotiation as the proposal suggests that all DOWN state frames are
> authenticated. The state machine does not change in this proposal but it
> only indicates which frames should be authenticated and which ones can use
> NULL-AUTH TLV (un-authenticated frames). *
>
> *And additional comments:*
>
> ·         *"For example, the two ends can decide that BFD frames that
> indicate a state change should be authenticated and enable authentication
> on those frames only."*
>
> *I don't think that nodes "decide" anything but are configured to do
> something.*
>
>
>
> *[AM] I agree that the language is not accurate. We’ll change it in the
> next revision. The intention is to use indicate configuration rather than
> negotiation. *
>
> ·         *"If the two ends have not previously negotiated which frames
> they will transmit or receive with authentication enabled ..."*
>
> *I couldn't find the negotiation procedure being described in the
> document. Is it out-of-band, i.e. by control or management plane, not part
> of this BFD enhancement?*
>
>
>
> *[AM] The language should indicate configuration instead of negotiation. *
>
> ·         *"The configuration of the periodic authentication interval for
> BFD CC UP frames is an open issue."*
>
> *I believe that this open issue must be resolved in the definitive manner
> before the draft moved to WGLC.*
>
>
>
> *[AM] This line should be removed and the preceding text should indicate
> that the parameters for authentication should be configured on the session
> end-points. *
>
>
>
> Regards,
> Ashesh
>
>
>
> *From: *Greg Mirsky <gregimirsky@gmail.com>
> *Date: *Monday, April 2, 2018 at 12:34 PM
> *To: *Ashesh Mishra <mishra.ashesh@outlook.com>
> *Cc: *Jeffrey Haas <jhaas@pfrc.org>, "rtg-bfd@ietf.org" <rtg-bfd@ietf.org>
>
>
> *Subject: *Re: WGLC BFD Authentication Drafts
>
>
>
> Hi Asheh,
>
> thank you for taking time to review the minutes from BFD WG meeting at
> IETF-98. I don't think that we had enough time to discuss in details my
> question:
>
> Greg Mirsky: One of the possible modes when the session is up is to use
> authentication with periodic timer trigger?
>
> I'd break it into couple more specific questions:
>
>    - can the periodic Optimized Authentication mode be used without
>    authorization o state changes;
>    - if the answer to the previous question "yes", then when the first
>    authorized BFD control packet must be transmitted by the system;
>    - does the BFD state machine (section 6.2 RFC 5880) changes resulting
>    from introduction of periodic optimized authentication mode;
>
> And additional comments:
>
>    - "For example, the two ends can decide that BFD frames that indicate
>    a state change should be authenticated and enable authentication on those
>    frames only."
>
> I don't think that nodes "decide" anything but are configured to do
> something.
>
>
>    - "If the two ends have not previously negotiated which frames they
>    will transmit or receive with authentication enabled ..."
>
> I couldn't find the negotiation procedure being described in the document.
> Is it out-of-band, i.e. by control or management plane, not part of this
> BFD enhancement?
>
>
>    - "The configuration of the periodic authentication interval for BFD
>    CC UP frames is an open issue."
>
> I believe that this open issue must be resolved in the definitive manner
> before the draft moved to WGLC.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Greg
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, Apr 1, 2018 at 6:11 PM, Ashesh Mishra <mishra.ashesh@outlook.com>
> wrote:
>
> Hi Greg,
>
>
>
> Your questions in the IETF-98 meeting seemed to stem from the challenges
> of authentication in fast BFD sessions at high scale.
>
>
>
> I'll address the issue in two parts -
>
>
>
> "Is there a need for authenticated BFD sessions?" - I believe we can all
> agree that there is a clear market need for BFD authentication. So we
> should direct the conversation to the way in which we can address this
> requirement.
>
>
>
> "How can authentication work at scale?" - BFD authentication puts
> significant stress on the system and a non-meticulous method alleviates
> this computation pressure. That's the premise of this draft as it presents
> a way to relieve the BFD authentication requirement based on the capability
> of the system to handle the additional stress which maintaining the
> session scale.
>
>
>
> There are some BFD systems in the market, which are not conducive to
> authentication (even the optimized method), where the impediment to
> authentication is due to the implementation details specific to that vendor
> or system.
>
>
>
> I believe all these issues were address during the meeting. Are there any
> specific questions that I missed or any recommendations for the method in
> which the requirements can be addressed?
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
> Ashesh
> ------------------------------
>
> *From:* Rtg-bfd <rtg-bfd-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Greg Mirsky <
> gregimirsky@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Thursday, March 29, 2018 4:09:32 AM
> *To:* Jeffrey Haas
> *Cc:* rtg-bfd@ietf.org
> *Subject:* Re: WGLC BFD Authentication Drafts
>
>
>
> Dear WG Chairs, et. al,
>
> I cannot support WG LC for draft-ietf-bfd-optimizing-authentication as my
> comments at BFD WG meeting dating back to IETF-98
> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/98/materials/minutes-98-bfd-00> still
> not have been addressed nor even there was an attempt to address. As I've
> asked to clarify impact of the proposed mechanism, particularly periodic
> authentication, on the BFD State Machine, I'd point that the proposed
> mechanism directly affects BFD security as discussed in RFC 5880 and the
> section Security Considerations in the document, in my view, does not
> adequately reflects that and doesn't explain how the security of the BFD
> session maintained when the periodic authentication is in use.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Greg
>
>
>
> On Wed, Mar 28, 2018 at 7:38 PM, Jeffrey Haas <jhaas@pfrc.org> wrote:
>
> Working Group,
>
> The authors of the following Working Group drafts have requested
> Working Group Last Call on the following documents:
>
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-bfd-secure-sequence-numbers-01
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-bfd-optimizing-authentication-04
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-bfd-stability-01
>
> Given the overlap of functionality, WGLC will conclude for the bundle
> simultaneously.
>
> Authors, please positively acknowledge whether or not you know about any
> IPR
> for your documents.  Progression of the document will not be done without
> that statement.
>
> Last call will complete on April 20.
>
> -- Jeff
>
>
>
>
>
>
>