< draft-ietf-bfd-vxlan-07.txt		draft-ietf-bfd-vxlan-08.txt >
	BFD S. Pallagatti, Ed.		BFD S. Pallagatti, Ed.
	Internet-Draft Rtbrick		Internet-Draft VMware
	Intended status: Standards Track S. Paragiri		Intended status: Standards Track S. Paragiri
	Expires: November 18, 2019 Individual Contributor		Expires: February 8, 2020 Individual Contributor
	V. Govindan		V. Govindan
	M. Mudigonda		M. Mudigonda
	Cisco		Cisco
	G. Mirsky		G. Mirsky
	ZTE Corp.		ZTE Corp.
	May 17, 2019		August 7, 2019
	BFD for VXLAN		BFD for VXLAN
	draft-ietf-bfd-vxlan-07		draft-ietf-bfd-vxlan-08
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document describes the use of the Bidirectional Forwarding		This document describes the use of the Bidirectional Forwarding
	Detection (BFD) protocol in point-to-point Virtual eXtensible Local		Detection (BFD) protocol in point-to-point Virtual eXtensible Local
	Area Network (VXLAN) tunnels forming up an overlay network.		Area Network (VXLAN) tunnels forming up an overlay network.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	skipping to change at page 1, line 38 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 38 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on November 18, 2019.		This Internet-Draft will expire on February 8, 2020.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 2, line 17 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 17 ¶
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	2. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2.2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2.2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3. Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3. Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	4. BFD Packet Transmission over VXLAN Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . 5		4. BFD Packet Transmission over VXLAN Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . 5
	4.1. BFD Packet Encapsulation in VXLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	5. Reception of BFD Packet from VXLAN Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . 7		5. Reception of BFD Packet from VXLAN Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . 7
	5.1. Demultiplexing of the BFD Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		5.1. Demultiplexing of the BFD Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	6. Use of the Specific VNI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		6. Use of the Specific VNI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	7. Echo BFD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		7. Echo BFD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	10. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		10. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	12.2. Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		12.2. Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	"Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network" (VXLAN) [RFC7348] provides an		"Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network" (VXLAN) [RFC7348] provides an
	encapsulation scheme that allows building an overlay network by		encapsulation scheme that allows building an overlay network by
	decoupling the address space of the attached virtual hosts from that		decoupling the address space of the attached virtual hosts from that
	of the network.		of the network.
	One use of VXLAN is in data centers interconnecting virtual machines		One use of VXLAN is in data centers interconnecting virtual machines
	skipping to change at page 3, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at page 3, line 4 ¶
	Ethernet VPN [RFC8365].		Ethernet VPN [RFC8365].
	This document is written assuming the use of VXLAN for virtualized		This document is written assuming the use of VXLAN for virtualized
	hosts and refers to VMs and VXLAN Tunnel End Points (VTEPs) in		hosts and refers to VMs and VXLAN Tunnel End Points (VTEPs) in
	hypervisors. However, the concepts are equally applicable to non-		hypervisors. However, the concepts are equally applicable to non-
	virtualized hosts attached to VTEPs in switches.		virtualized hosts attached to VTEPs in switches.
	In the absence of a router in the overlay, a VM can communicate with		In the absence of a router in the overlay, a VM can communicate with
	another VM only if they are on the same VXLAN segment. VMs are		another VM only if they are on the same VXLAN segment. VMs are
	unaware of VXLAN tunnels as a VXLAN tunnel is terminated on a VTEP.		unaware of VXLAN tunnels as a VXLAN tunnel is terminated on a VTEP.
	VTEPs are responsible for encapsulating and decapsulating frames		VTEPs are responsible for encapsulating and decapsulating frames
	exchanged among VMs.		exchanged among VMs.
	Ability to monitor path continuity, i.e., perform proactive		Ability to monitor path continuity, i.e., perform proactive
	continuity check (CC) for point-to-point (p2p) VXLAN tunnels, is		continuity check (CC) for point-to-point (p2p) VXLAN tunnels, is
	important. The asynchronous mode of BFD, as defined in [RFC5880],		important. The asynchronous mode of BFD, as defined in [RFC5880], is
	can be used to monitor a p2p VXLAN tunnel.		used to monitor a p2p VXLAN tunnel.
	In the case where a Multicast Service Node (MSN) (as described in		In the case where a Multicast Service Node (MSN) (as described in
	Section 3.3 of [RFC8293]) resides behind an NVE, the mechanisms		Section 3.3 of [RFC8293]) resides behind a Network Virtualization
	described in this document apply and can, therefore, be used to test		Endpoint (NVE), the mechanisms described in this document apply and
	the connectivity from the source NVE to the MSN.		can, therefore, be used to test the connectivity from the source NVE
			to the MSN.
	This document describes the use of Bidirectional Forwarding Detection		This document describes the use of Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
	(BFD) protocol to enable monitoring continuity of the path between		(BFD) protocol to enable monitoring continuity of the path between
	VXLAN VTEPs, performing as Network Virtualization Endpoints, and/or		VXLAN VTEPs, performing as Network Virtualization Endpoints, and/or
	availability of a replicator multicast service node.		availability of a replicator multicast service node.
	2. Conventions used in this document		2. Conventions used in this document
	2.1. Terminology		2.1. Terminology
	BFD Bidirectional Forwarding Detection		BFD Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
	CC Continuity Check		CC Continuity Check
	p2p Point-to-point		p2p Point-to-point
	MSN Multicast Service Node		MSN Multicast Service Node
			NVE Network Virtualization Endpoint
	VFI Virtual Forwarding Instance		VFI Virtual Forwarding Instance
	VM Virtual Machine		VM Virtual Machine
			VNI VXLAN Network Identifier (or VXLAN Segment ID)
	VTEP VXLAN Tunnel End Point		VTEP VXLAN Tunnel End Point
	VXLAN Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network		VXLAN Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network
	2.2. Requirements Language		2.2. Requirements Language
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
	"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP		"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
	14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all		14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
	capitals, as shown here.		capitals, as shown here.
	3. Deployment		3. Deployment
	Figure 1 illustrates the scenario with two servers, each of them		Figure 1 illustrates the scenario with two servers, each of them
	hosting two VMs. The servers host VTEPs that terminate two VXLAN		hosting two VMs. The servers host VTEPs that terminate two VXLAN
	tunnels with VNI number 100 and 200 respectively. Separate BFD		tunnels with VXLAN Network Identifier (VNI) number 100 and 200
	sessions can be established between the VTEPs (IP1 and IP2) for		respectively. Separate BFD sessions can be established between the
	monitoring each of the VXLAN tunnels (VNI 100 and 200). An		VTEPs (IP1 and IP2) for monitoring each of the VXLAN tunnels (VNI 100
	implementation that supports this specification MUST be able to		and 200). An implementation that supports this specification MUST be
	control the number of BFD sessions that can be created between the		able to control the number of BFD sessions that can be created
	same pair of VTEPs. BFD packets intended for a Hypervisor VTEP MUST		between the same pair of VTEPs. BFD packets intended for a
	NOT be forwarded to a VM as a VM may drop BFD packets leading to a		Hypervisor VTEP MUST NOT be forwarded to a VM as a VM may drop BFD
	false negative. This method is applicable whether the VTEP is a		packets leading to a false negative. This method is applicable
	virtual or physical device.		whether the VTEP is a virtual or physical device.
	+------------+-------------+		+------------+-------------+
	| Server 1 |		| Server 1 |
	| |
	| +----+----+ +----+----+ |		| +----+----+ +----+----+ |
	| |VM1-1 | |VM1-2 | |		| |VM1-1 | |VM1-2 | |
	| |VNI 100 | |VNI 200 | |		| |VNI 100 | |VNI 200 | |
	| | | | | |		| | | | | |
	| +---------+ +---------+ |		| +---------+ +---------+ |
	| Hypervisor VTEP (IP1) |		| Hypervisor VTEP (IP1) |
	+--------------------------+		+--------------------------+
	|		|
	|
	|
	| +-------------+		| +-------------+
	| | Layer 3 |		| | Layer 3 |
	|---| Network |		+---| Network |
	| |
	+-------------+		+-------------+
	|		|
	|
	+-----------+		+-----------+
	|		|
	|
	+------------+-------------+		+------------+-------------+
	| Hypervisor VTEP (IP2) |		| Hypervisor VTEP (IP2) |
	| +----+----+ +----+----+ |		| +----+----+ +----+----+ |
	| |VM2-1 | |VM2-2 | |		| |VM2-1 | |VM2-2 | |
	| |VNI 100 | |VNI 200 | |		| |VNI 100 | |VNI 200 | |
	| | | | | |		| | | | | |
	| +---------+ +---------+ |		| +---------+ +---------+ |
	| Server 2 |		| Server 2 |
	+--------------------------+		+--------------------------+
	Figure 1: Reference VXLAN Domain		Figure 1: Reference VXLAN Domain
			At the same time, a service layer BFD session may be used between the
			tenants of VTEPs IP1 and IP2 to provide end-to-end fault management.
			In such case, for VTEPs BFD Control packets of that session are
			indistinguishable from data packets. If end-to-end defect detection
			is realized as the set of concatenated OAM domains, e.g., VM1-1 - IP1
			-- IP2 - VM2-1, then the BFD session over VXLAN between VTEPs SHOULD
			follow the procedures described in Section 6.8.17 [RFC5880].
	4. BFD Packet Transmission over VXLAN Tunnel		4. BFD Packet Transmission over VXLAN Tunnel
	BFD packet MUST be encapsulated and sent to a remote VTEP as		BFD packet MUST be encapsulated and sent to a remote VTEP as
	explained in Section 4.1. Implementations SHOULD ensure that the BFD		explained in this section. Implementations SHOULD ensure that the
	packets follow the same lookup path as VXLAN data packets within the		BFD packets follow the same lookup path as VXLAN data packets within
	sender system.		the sender system.
	4.1. BFD Packet Encapsulation in VXLAN
	BFD packets are encapsulated in VXLAN as described below. The VXLAN		BFD packets are encapsulated in VXLAN as described below. The VXLAN
	packet format is defined in Section 5 of [RFC7348]. The Outer IP/UDP		packet format is defined in Section 5 of [RFC7348]. The Outer IP/UDP
	and VXLAN headers MUST be encoded by the sender as defined in		and VXLAN headers MUST be encoded by the sender as defined in
	[RFC7348].		[RFC7348].
	0 1 2 3		0 1 2 3
	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1		0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| |		| |
	skipping to change at page 6, line 44 ¶		skipping to change at page 6, line 37 ¶
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| |		| |
	~ Inner IPvX Header ~		~ Inner IPvX Header ~
	| |		| |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| |		| |
	~ Inner UDP Header ~		~ Inner UDP Header ~
	| |		| |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| |		| |
	~ BFD Control Message ~		~ BFD Control Packet ~
	| |		| |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| FCS |		| FCS |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	Figure 2: VXLAN Encapsulation of BFD Control Message		Figure 2: VXLAN Encapsulation of BFD Control Packet
	The BFD packet MUST be carried inside the inner MAC frame of the		The BFD packet MUST be carried inside the inner Ethernet frame of the
	VXLAN packet. The inner MAC frame carrying the BFD payload has the		VXLAN packet. The choice of Destination MAC and Destination IP
	following format:		addresses for the inner Ethernet frame MUST ensure that the BFD
			Control packet is not forwarded to a tenant but is processed locally
			at the remote VTEP. The inner Ethernet frame carrying the BFD
			Control packet- has the following format:
	Ethernet Header:		Ethernet Header:
	Destination MAC: This MUST be the dedicated MAC TBA (Section 8)		Destination MAC: This MUST NOT be of one of tenant's MAC
	or the MAC address of the destination VTEP. The details of how		addresses. The MAC address MAY be configured, or it MAY be
	the MAC address of the destination VTEP is obtained are outside		learned via a control plane protocol. The details of how the
	the scope of this document.		MAC address is obtained are outside the scope of this document.
	Source MAC: MAC address of the originating VTEP		Source MAC: MAC address associated with the originating VTEP
	IP header:		IP header:
	Source IP: IP address of the originating VTEP.		Destination IP: IP address MUST NOT be of one of tenant's IP
			addresses. IP address MAY be selected from the range 127/8 for
			IPv4, for IPv6 - from the range 0:0:0:0:0:FFFF:7F00:0/104.
	Destination IP: IP address of the terminating VTEP.		Source IP: IP address of the originating VTEP.
	TTL: MUST be set to 1 to ensure that the BFD packet is not		TTL: MUST be set to 1 to ensure that the BFD packet is not
	routed within the L3 underlay network.		routed within the L3 underlay network.
	The fields of the UDP header and the BFD control packet are		The fields of the UDP header and the BFD Control packet are
	encoded as specified in [RFC5881].		encoded as specified in [RFC5881].
	5. Reception of BFD Packet from VXLAN Tunnel		5. Reception of BFD Packet from VXLAN Tunnel
	Once a packet is received, VTEP MUST validate the packet. If the		Once a packet is received, VTEP MUST validate the packet. If the
	Destination MAC of the inner MAC frame matches the dedicated MAC or		Destination MAC of the inner Ethernet frame matches one of the MAC
	the MAC address of the VTEP the packet MUST be processed further.		addresses associated with the VTEP the packet MUST be processed
			further. If the Destination MAC of the inner Ethernet frame doesn't
			match any of VTEP's MAC addresses, then the processing of the
			received VXLAN packet MUST follow the procedures described in
			Section 4.1 [RFC7348].
	The UDP destination port and the TTL of the inner IP packet MUST be		The UDP destination port and the TTL of the inner IP packet MUST be
	validated to determine if the received packet can be processed by		validated to determine if the received packet can be processed by
	BFD. BFD packet with inner MAC set to VTEP or dedicated MAC address		BFD. BFD Control packets with unknown MAC address MUST NOT be
	MUST NOT be forwarded to VMs.		forwarded to VMs.
	5.1. Demultiplexing of the BFD Packet		5.1. Demultiplexing of the BFD Packet
	Demultiplexing of IP BFD packet has been defined in Section 3 of		Demultiplexing of IP BFD packet has been defined in Section 3 of
	[RFC5881]. Since multiple BFD sessions may be running between two		[RFC5881]. Since multiple BFD sessions may be running between two
	VTEPs, there needs to be a mechanism for demultiplexing received BFD		VTEPs, there needs to be a mechanism for demultiplexing received BFD
	packets to the proper session. The procedure for demultiplexing		packets to the proper session. The procedure for demultiplexing
	packets with Your Discriminator equal to 0 is different from		packets with Your Discriminator equal to 0 is different from
	[RFC5880]. For such packets, the BFD session MUST be identified		[RFC5880]. For such packets, the BFD session MUST be identified
	using the inner headers, i.e., the source IP, the destination IP, and		using the following three-tuples of fields of the inner header: the
	the source UDP port number present in the IP header carried by the		source IP, the destination IP, and the source UDP port number present
	payload of the VXLAN encapsulated packet. The VNI of the packet		in the IP header carried by the payload of the packet in VXLAN
	SHOULD be used to derive interface-related information for		encapsulation. If BFD packet is received with non-zero Your
	demultiplexing the packet. If BFD packet is received with non-zero		Discriminator, then BFD session MUST be demultiplexed only with Your
	Your Discriminator, then BFD session MUST be demultiplexed only with		Discriminator as the key.
	Your Discriminator as the key.
	6. Use of the Specific VNI		6. Use of the Specific VNI
	In most cases, a single BFD session is sufficient for the given VTEP		In most cases, a single BFD session is sufficient for the given VTEP
	to monitor the reachability of a remote VTEP, regardless of the		to monitor the reachability of a remote VTEP, regardless of the
	number of VNIs in common. When the single BFD session is used to		number of VNIs in common. When the single BFD session is used to
	monitor the reachability of the remote VTEP, an implementation SHOULD		monitor the reachability of the remote VTEP, an implementation SHOULD
	choose any of the VNIs but MAY choose VNI = 0.		choose any of the VNIs. An implementation MAY support the use of the
			Management VNI as control and management channel between VTEPs. The
			selection of the VNI number of the Management VNI MUST be controlled
			through management plane. An implementation MAY use VNI number 1 as
			the default value for the Management VNI. All VXLAN packets received
			on the Management VNI MUST be processed locally and MUST NOT be
			forwarded to a tenant.
	7. Echo BFD		7. Echo BFD
	Support for echo BFD is outside the scope of this document.		Support for echo BFD is outside the scope of this document.
	8. IANA Considerations		8. IANA Considerations
	IANA has assigned TBA as a dedicated MAC address from the IANA 48-bit		This specification has no IANA action requested. This section may be
	unicast MAC address registry to be used as the Destination MAC		deleted before the publication.
	address of the inner Ethernet of VXLAN when carrying BFD control
	packets.
	9. Security Considerations		9. Security Considerations
	The document requires setting the inner IP TTL to 1, which could be		The document requires setting the inner IP TTL to 1, which could be
	used as a DDoS attack vector. Thus the implementation MUST have		used as a DDoS attack vector. Thus the implementation MUST have
	throttling in place to control the rate of BFD control packets sent		throttling in place to control the rate of BFD Control packets sent
	to the control plane. Throttling MAY be relaxed for BFD packets		to the control plane. On the other hand, over-aggressive throttling
	based on port number.		of BFD Control packets may become the cause of the inability to form
			and maintain BFD session at scale. Hence, throttling of BFD Control
			packets SHOULD be adjusted to permit BFD to work according to its
			procedures.
	The implementation SHOULD have a reasonable upper bound on the number		If the implementation supports establishing multiple BFD sessions
	of BFD sessions that can be created between the same pair of VTEPs.		between the same pair of VTEPs, there SHOULD be a mechanism to
			control the maximum number of such sessions that can be active at the
			same time.
	Other than inner IP TTL set to 1 and limit the number of BFD sessions		Other than inner IP TTL set to 1 and limit the number of BFD sessions
	between the same pair of VTEPs, this specification does not raise any		between the same pair of VTEPs, this specification does not raise any
	additional security issues beyond those of the specifications		additional security issues beyond those of the specifications
	referred to in the list of normative references.		referred to in the list of normative references.
	10. Contributors		10. Contributors
	Reshad Rahman		Reshad Rahman
	rrahman@cisco.com		rrahman@cisco.com
	skipping to change at page 10, line 14 ¶		skipping to change at page 10, line 22 ¶
	[RFC8365] Sajassi, A., Ed., Drake, J., Ed., Bitar, N., Shekhar, R.,		[RFC8365] Sajassi, A., Ed., Drake, J., Ed., Bitar, N., Shekhar, R.,
	Uttaro, J., and W. Henderickx, "A Network Virtualization		Uttaro, J., and W. Henderickx, "A Network Virtualization
	Overlay Solution Using Ethernet VPN (EVPN)", RFC 8365,		Overlay Solution Using Ethernet VPN (EVPN)", RFC 8365,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC8365, March 2018,		DOI 10.17487/RFC8365, March 2018,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8365>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8365>.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Santosh Pallagatti (editor)		Santosh Pallagatti (editor)
	Rtbrick		VMware
	Email: santosh.pallagatti@gmail.com		Email: santosh.pallagatti@gmail.com
	Sudarsan Paragiri		Sudarsan Paragiri
	Individual Contributor		Individual Contributor
	Email: sudarsan.225@gmail.com		Email: sudarsan.225@gmail.com
	Vengada Prasad Govindan		Vengada Prasad Govindan
	Cisco		Cisco
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