< draft-ietf-teas-actn-info-model-08.txt		draft-ietf-teas-actn-info-model-09.txt >
	Teas Working Group Young Lee		Teas Working Group Young Lee
	Internet Draft Huawei		Internet Draft Huawei
	Intended status: Informational Sergio Belotti		Intended status: Informational Sergio Belotti
	Nokia		Nokia
	Expires: November 3, 2018		Expires: December 15, 2018
	Dhruv Dhody		Dhruv Dhody
	Huawei		Huawei
	Daniele Ceccarelli		Daniele Ceccarelli
	Ericsson		Ericsson
	Bin Yeong Yoon		Bin Yeong Yoon
	ETRI		ETRI
	May 3, 2018		June 15, 2018
	Information Model for Abstraction and Control of TE Networks (ACTN)		Information Model for Abstraction and Control of TE Networks (ACTN)
	draft-ietf-teas-actn-info-model-08.txt		draft-ietf-teas-actn-info-model-08.txt
	Abstract		Abstract
	This draft provides an information model for Abstraction and Control		This draft provides an information model for Abstraction and Control
	of Traffic Engineered Networks (ACTN).		of Traffic Engineered Networks (ACTN).
	skipping to change at page 2, line 7 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 7 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
	months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents		months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents
	at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as		at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as
	reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at		The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
	http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt		http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
	The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at		The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
	http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.		http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
	This Internet-Draft will expire on November 3, 2018.		This Internet-Draft will expire on December 15, 2018.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 21, line 14 ¶		skipping to change at page 21, line 14 ¶
	<TE Topology Update> ::= <TE-topology-list>		<TE Topology Update> ::= <TE-topology-list>
	<Path Compute Request> ::= <TE Tunnel Characteristics>		<Path Compute Request> ::= <TE Tunnel Characteristics>
	<Path Compute Reply> ::= <TE Computed Path>		<Path Compute Reply> ::= <TE Computed Path>
	<TE Tunnel Characteristics>		<TE Tunnel Characteristics>
	9. Security Considerations		9. Security Considerations
	The ACTN information model described in this document defines key		The ACTN information model does not directly introduce security
	interfaces for managed traffic engineered networks. Securing the		issues. Rather, it defines a set of interfaces for traffic
	request and control of resources, confidentiality of the		engineered networks. The underlying protocols, procedures, and
	information, and availability of function, should all be critical		implementations used to exchange the information model described
	security considerations when deploying and operating ACTN platforms.		in this draft will need to secure the request and control of
			resources with proper authentication and authorization mechanisms.
			In addition, the data exchanged over the ACTN interfaces discussed
			in this document requires verification of data integrity. Backup or
			redundancies SHOULD also be available to restore the affected data
			to its correct state.
	Several distributed ACTN functional components are required, and		Implementations of the ACTN framework will have distributed
	implementations should consider encrypting data that flows between		functional components that will exchange this information model.
	components, especially when they are implemented at remote nodes,		Implementations SHOULD encrypt data that flows between them,
	regardless of these data flows are on external or internal network		especially when they are implemented at remote nodes and
	interfaces.		irrespective of whether these data flows are on external or internal
			network interfaces. The information model may contain customer,
			application and network data that for business or privacy reasons
			may be considered sensitive. It SHOULD be stored only in an
			encrypted data store.
	The ACTN security discussion is further split into two specific		The ACTN security discussion is further split into two specific
	categories described in the following sub-sections:		interfaces:
	- Interface between the Customer Network Controller and Multi Domain		- Interface between the Customer Network Controller and Multi
	Service Coordinator (MDSC), CNC-MDSC Interface (CMI)		Domain Service Coordinator (MDSC), CNC-MDSC Interface (CMI)
	- Interface between the Multi Domain Service Coordinator and		- Interface between the Multi Domain Service Coordinator and
	Provisioning Network Controller (PNC), MDSC-PNC Interface (MPI)		Provisioning Network Controller (PNC), MDSC-PNC Interface (MPI)
	From a security and reliability perspective, ACTN may encounter many		See the detailed discussion of the CMI and MPI in Sections 9.1 and
	risks such as malicious attack and rogue elements attempting to		9.2, respectively in [ACTN-Frame].
	connect to various ACTN components. Furthermore, some ACTN
	components represent a single point of failure and threat vector,
	and must also manage policy conflicts, and eavesdropping of
	communication between different ACTN components.
	The conclusion is that all data models and protocols used to realize		The conclusion is that all data models and protocols used to
	the ACTN info model should have rich security features, and		realize the ACTN info model should have rich security features as
	customer, application and network data should be stored in encrypted		discussed in this section. Additional security risks may still
	data stores. Additional security risks may still exist. Therefore,		exist. Therefore, discussion and applicability of specific security
	discussion and applicability of specific security functions and		functions and protocols will be better described in documents that
	protocols will be better described in documents that are use case		are use case and environment specific
	and environment specific.
	10. IANA Considerations		10. IANA Considerations
	This document has no actions for IANA.		This document has no actions for IANA.
	11. References		11. References
	11.1. Normative References		11.1. Normative References
	[ACTN-REQ] Y. Lee, et al., "Requirements for Abstraction and Control		[ACTN-REQ] Y. Lee, et al., "Requirements for Abstraction and Control
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