Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security
Stewart Bryant <stewart.bryant@gmail.com> Mon, 30 July 2018 10:29 UTC
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Subject: Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security
To: Greg Mirsky <gregimirsky@gmail.com>, Robert Raszuk <robert@raszuk.net>
Cc: "rtgwg@ietf.org" <rtgwg@ietf.org>
References: <CA+b+ERmfOaFMURD2eNPScs2SZ88rOEfGXZZJsqGDWX3M6bTY-g@mail.gmail.com> <0cb8f15b-7538-500c-dda3-915bf9814f94@gmail.com> <5D10C0C4-B93D-463F-A071-EEA6F35506CD@cisco.com> <CA+b+ERkqrr4Wr+Wy9q81SpyWi7H1s=z_RAvbc3Rbddvpgb7Xpg@mail.gmail.com> <76CD132C3ADEF848BD84D028D243C927A71506F6@NKGEML515-MBS.china.huawei.com> <CA+b+ERmWDhXf0ia8mQ25=QZw-h_ipkAQnttsirQb3kOk_fhUVA@mail.gmail.com> <CA+RyBmX1Wj-aH+rWhQ1LLVrBkEq12Hz-DT1gYBF0TRx1ewaEzg@mail.gmail.com>
From: Stewart Bryant <stewart.bryant@gmail.com>
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Date: Mon, 30 Jul 2018 11:29:42 +0100
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On 28/07/2018 20:34, Greg Mirsky wrote: > Hi Robert, > very much agree with all you're saying and find us in violent > agreement on "C". Proactive performance monitoring, in my view as > well, is the reasonable path to provide "soft" SLA and, to a degree, > prevent oversubscription of the network. And that, as you've said, is > one way to "assured/guaranteed global IP transit". > But I think that there will be demand for "hard" guarantees for > URLLC applications. But these, in my view, would not require global > transit and likely be contained within access or, at most, metro > domains. Because of the limited size of the domain, IntServ may work, > though that may be not the most efficient technique.. We shall find out. > Hence my view on slicing: > > * different applications will have different requirements and use > different degrees of isolation and guarantees; > * "soft" slices may not need much of additional standardization and > use available VPN technologies in combination with PM OAM for SLA > monitoring and assurance; > I agree up to here. > * "hard" slices would span within a single access and/or metro domain. > I agree that this is likely to be the majority case, but would not rule out a larger network for some applications. > * Networking solutions likely will be coupled with architecture and > interfaces developed in Multi-access Edge Computing (MEC). > That is true, but may not be exclusively true. - Stewart > Regards, > Greg > > On Sat, Jul 28, 2018 at 6:02 AM, Robert Raszuk <robert@raszuk.net > <mailto:robert@raszuk.net>> wrote: > > Hi Jie, > > > (network slicing) is to provide the demanding services with > guaranteed performance in a converged network, > > > Foundation of converged IP network is based on statistical > multiplexing of traffic demands. As such it is in its principle > quite contradictory to "guaranteed" characteristics (performance, > delays, jitter, drops -- you name it). > > Application layers usually deal very well with all of the above I > would state - normal characteristics of IP networks.. > > No doubt there will be those trying to offer some network slicing > with guarantees and even those who will buy it. Just like today > there are those who offer you L2 circuit between endpoints except > such L2 circuit is an emulated one with zero OEM visibility to the > IP infrastructure underneath. > > Now the network slicing is clearly aiming for even more complexity > under the hood. And that is not the only problem. The issue is > cost. When SP is building the IP network the goal is to mux as > many services on it as it simply results in given's SP revenue. > Network slicing is promising as potentially just by configuration > of few knobs they will be claiming guarantees as RFC says - except > RFC will not likely tell you to stop over-provisioning. > > Unless the idea is to use strict policing with dedicated queuing > on active and back paths or do something like RSVP IntServ also on > active and backup paths per customer - I really don't think you > can really guarantee much. And if you do that the cost would > likely grow really steep. > > So what is IMO the solution for assured/guaranteed global IP transit: > > *A* get diversely routed dark fiber paths between your POPs (can > be unprotected) which btw today do not cost that much anymore > *B* get diversely routed optical channels alsol between your POPs > (can be unprotected) > > *C* use N disjoined by design (single AS Internet providers > between your end-points) + proper SD-WAN with active SLA monitoring > > Clearly I am big supporter of *C* model for reasons discussed on > this and few other recent threads. > > I assume network slicing will try to get into be something between > A/B & C but it is bounded up front with the cost of the two. > > Many thx, > Robert. > > > > > On Sat, Jul 28, 2018 at 9:51 AM, Dongjie (Jimmy) > <jie.dong@huawei.com <mailto:jie.dong@huawei.com>> wrote: > > Hi Robert, > > IMO the two approaches are targeting at different use cases > and customers. > > The former (network slicing) is to provide the demanding > services with guaranteed performance in a converged network, > while the latter (switching between multiple paralleled > networks) provides the customer with the best performance that > is available among those candidates. To me the latter is still > some kind of best effort, and as Toerless said, it depends on > the diversity you can have in the multiple networks. > > And I agree with Stewart on “you always pay a price for better > than best effort.” > > Best regards, > > Jie > > *From:*rtgwg [mailto:rtgwg-bounces@ietf.org > <mailto:rtgwg-bounces@ietf.org>] *On Behalf Of *Robert Raszuk > *Sent:* Wednesday, July 25, 2018 8:24 PM > *To:* Acee Lindem (acee) <acee@cisco.com <mailto:acee@cisco.com>> > *Cc:* rtgwg@ietf.org <mailto:rtgwg@ietf.org> > > > *Subject:* Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security > > True network slicing for IP networks means either waist of > resources or very strict multi-level queuing at each hop and > 100% ingress traffic policing. Yet while this has a chance to > work during normal operation at the time of even regular > failures this all pretty much melts like cheese on a good > sandwich. > > It is going to be very interesting to compare how single > complex sliced network compares for any end to end robust > transport from N normal simple IP backbones and end to end SLA > based millisecond switch over between one and another on a per > flow basis. Also let's note then while the former is still to > the best of my knowledge a draft the latter is already > deployed globally in 100s of networks. > > Best, > R. > > On Wed, Jul 25, 2018 at 1:21 PM, Acee Lindem (acee) > <acee@cisco.com <mailto:acee@cisco.com>> wrote: > > *From: *rtgwg <rtgwg-bounces@ietf.org > <mailto:rtgwg-bounces@ietf.org>> on behalf of Stewart > Bryant <stewart.bryant@gmail.com > <mailto:stewart.bryant@gmail.com>> > *Date: *Wednesday, July 25, 2018 at 5:55 AM > *To: *Robert Raszuk <robert@raszuk.net > <mailto:robert@raszuk.net>> > *Cc: *Routing WG <rtgwg@ietf.org <mailto:rtgwg@ietf.org>> > *Subject: *Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security > > On 25/07/2018 10:40, Robert Raszuk wrote: > > /* Adjusting the subject ... */ > > Hello > > Stewart, > > You have made the below comment in the other thread > we are having: > > Indeed, I would have expected this to be on a > secure network of some sort either purely > private or some form of VPN. However, I am sure I > read in your text that you were > considering using the Public Internet much in the > way of SD-WAN. > > Would you mind as extensively as you can expand on > the above statement ? > > Specifically on what basis do you treat say L2VPN or > L3VPN of naked unencrypted packets often traveling on > the very same links as this "bad" Internet traffic to > be even slightly more secure then IPSEC or DTLS > encrypted SD-WAN carried data with endpoints being > terminated in private systems ? > > Thx, > > Robert > > > Robert, I think that you have to take it as read that an > air traffic control SoF system is encrypting its packets. > If it is not, then it is clearly not fit for purpose. > > What concerns me is that an air traffic system is one of > the most, if not the most, high profile targets in civil > society. You get reminded of this each time you travel to > IETF. > > The thing about safety of flight traffic is that a > sustained and effective DDoS attack has global impact in a > way that few other such attacks have. > > A VPN system ought to sustain resistance to such an attack > better than the proposed system which treats the SoF > traffic the same as regular traffic. > > I guess you are making a case for your network slicing work 😉 > > Acee > > > > - Stewart > > > > _______________________________________________ > rtgwg mailing list > rtgwg@ietf.org <mailto:rtgwg@ietf.org> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rtgwg > <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rtgwg> > > > > > _______________________________________________ > rtgwg mailing list > rtgwg@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rtgwg
- Re: 答复: VPN security vs SD-WAN security Joel M. Halpern
- 答复: VPN security vs SD-WAN security Dongjie (Jimmy)
- VPN security vs SD-WAN security Robert Raszuk
- Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security Stewart Bryant
- Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security Robert Raszuk
- Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security Acee Lindem (acee)
- Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security Robert Raszuk
- Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security Stewart Bryant
- AW: VPN security vs SD-WAN security Ruediger.Geib
- Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security Stewart Bryant
- Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security Toerless Eckert
- Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security Robert Raszuk
- Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security Toerless Eckert
- Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security Greg Mirsky
- Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security Robert Raszuk
- RE: VPN security vs SD-WAN security Dongjie (Jimmy)
- Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security Robert Raszuk
- Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security Greg Mirsky
- Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security Toerless Eckert
- Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security Robert Raszuk
- Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security Stewart Bryant
- Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security Stewart Bryant
- Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security Stewart Bryant
- RE: VPN security vs SD-WAN security Dongjie (Jimmy)
- RE: VPN security vs SD-WAN security Dongjie (Jimmy)
- Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security Joel M. Halpern
- Re: [Teas] 答复: VPN security vs SD-WAN security Stewart Bryant
- AW: [Teas] 答复: VPN security vs SD-WAN security Ruediger.Geib
- Re: [Teas] 答复: VPN security vs SD-WAN security Robert Raszuk
- Re: AW: [Teas] 答复: VPN security vs SD-WAN security Stewart Bryant
- Re: [Teas] 答复: VPN security vs SD-WAN security Stewart Bryant