Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security

Robert Raszuk <robert@raszuk.net> Wed, 25 July 2018 12:24 UTC

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From: Robert Raszuk <robert@raszuk.net>
Date: Wed, 25 Jul 2018 14:24:24 +0200
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Subject: Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security
To: "Acee Lindem (acee)" <acee@cisco.com>
Cc: Stewart Bryant <stewart.bryant@gmail.com>, "rtgwg@ietf.org" <rtgwg@ietf.org>
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True network slicing for IP networks means either waist of resources or
very strict multi-level queuing at each hop and 100% ingress traffic
policing. Yet while this has a chance to work during normal operation at
the time of even regular failures this all pretty much melts like cheese on
a good sandwich.

It is going to be very interesting to compare how single complex sliced
network compares for any end to end robust transport from N normal simple
IP backbones and end to end SLA based millisecond switch over between one
and another on a per flow basis. Also let's note then while the former is
still to the best of my knowledge a draft the latter is already deployed
globally in 100s of networks.

Best,
R.


On Wed, Jul 25, 2018 at 1:21 PM, Acee Lindem (acee) <acee@cisco.com>; wrote:

>
>
>
>
> *From: *rtgwg <rtgwg-bounces@ietf.org>; on behalf of Stewart Bryant <
> stewart.bryant@gmail.com>;
> *Date: *Wednesday, July 25, 2018 at 5:55 AM
> *To: *Robert Raszuk <robert@raszuk.net>;
> *Cc: *Routing WG <rtgwg@ietf.org>;
> *Subject: *Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On 25/07/2018 10:40, Robert Raszuk wrote:
>
> /* Adjusting the subject ... */
>
>
>
> ​Hello ​
>
> Stewart,
>
>
>
> ​You have made the below comment in the other thread we are having: ​
>
>
>
> Indeed, I would have expected this to be on a secure network of some sort
> either purely
> private or some form of VPN. However, I am sure I read in your text that
> you were
> considering using the Public Internet much in the way of SD-WAN.
>
>
>
> ​Would you mind as extensively as you can expand on the above statement ?
>
>
>
> Specifically on what basis do you treat say L2VPN or L3VPN of naked
> unencrypted packets often traveling on the very same links as this "bad"
> Internet traffic to be even slightly more secure then IPSEC or DTLS
> encrypted SD-WAN carried data with endpoints being terminated in private
> systems ?
>
>
>
> Thx,
>
> Robert
>
>
> Robert, I think that you have to take it as read that an air traffic
> control SoF system is encrypting its packets. If it is not, then it is
> clearly not fit for purpose.
>
> What concerns me is that an air traffic system is one of the most, if not
> the most, high profile targets in civil society. You get reminded of this
> each time you travel to IETF.
>
> The thing about safety of flight traffic is that a sustained and effective
> DDoS attack has global impact in a way that few other such attacks have.
>
> A VPN system ought to sustain resistance to such an attack better than the
> proposed system which treats the SoF traffic the same as regular traffic.
>
>
>
> I guess you are making a case for your network slicing work 😉
>
>
>
> Acee
>
>
>
> - Stewart
>
>
>