Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security

Greg Mirsky <gregimirsky@gmail.com> Wed, 25 July 2018 19:31 UTC

Return-Path: <gregimirsky@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: rtgwg@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: rtgwg@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3B3D6130DD8 for <rtgwg@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 25 Jul 2018 12:31:50 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.999
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.999 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Q8gfpc681njK for <rtgwg@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 25 Jul 2018 12:31:45 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-lj1-x22c.google.com (mail-lj1-x22c.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::22c]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2A611130F03 for <rtgwg@ietf.org>; Wed, 25 Jul 2018 12:31:45 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-lj1-x22c.google.com with SMTP id l15-v6so7677647lji.6 for <rtgwg@ietf.org>; Wed, 25 Jul 2018 12:31:45 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=K+HGsjGLVMsV/yIWBpus8OeV3nt29jUB8wAuDzSAwKU=; b=gOCEd72Iu1iW6Zb+jKNROmehGP4XPBrHjppnceFLBzrYQrsvrMBzIRI/lV8bn8WJz1 7vLNVCXVEZBJweqvJ+iGClZI8RpM6UxR/ilIwnICWUCaLVybhK6XozHIyLrOWcsS5kmd BlEYlrNjOEHWrpjAYSp18JyTcg733vwxIaJVprSsY4G228asFkozzmrGb/2Nbbr+1wNT 7bvPuFfjmS0ZdXqTMJ6Vjf7Z6kLMzBkWFnJM7+5vkt5KEq7DDxe4QrBNreZcZ+jA9xgh BB/OOz+n0wS5OTMVeXWa09ubbd3VUJLMPQibGgCIhFZRvrP9deRRiowpNDjV8nhcuJd2 xsjg==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=K+HGsjGLVMsV/yIWBpus8OeV3nt29jUB8wAuDzSAwKU=; b=iywqka09lFK7RT2+BOOX+cYurnvrq5FRohdzv8LaWv37Kif76l0+xIqESGguvM9mYZ xdrF1UGZPkECRK985TcjDEWvXVaP+4/r8jmVZKtigwrdqiS/7I7AcbmWYYz43TJYpnNN ZsIqF0B+E4Op96ESfGutAfyGNj+H3fjX7ZgeLNmwJCAjZgRT+eEfoA7KcWTEZj/FWs86 q8QmqlCaqs3NR+Ip5im5XyQPx6cCMUXxmfuZP5cy4Z0vklhufog19luYdhF+ZFtirXTh ezWrg6uJjreIA9Ydu/hBLUjuPrlO3cPrCi3yT5VpEvqepY2u4GkP6GhK69zGJ8evj4FS 5qsQ==
X-Gm-Message-State: AOUpUlEpmzjzikTWKHg73Uu8H2RkpsUCQmrUQM+zbQiRnDAuYSU26o/1 aOhmxSLucOpNKcf18VdD4XR/qiVaavohO1KpG94+Xg==
X-Google-Smtp-Source: AAOMgpd5gaJAgA4edLj4XeQhaQ4hZzJdi2OWk48a8OrPzBfCZHLiDiQlVlXZcb1wMDGcgX3lA1qBSzfl+JxBo9MIc0c=
X-Received: by 2002:a2e:610a:: with SMTP id v10-v6mr15821046ljb.39.1532547103346; Wed, 25 Jul 2018 12:31:43 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 2002:a2e:709:0:0:0:0:0 with HTTP; Wed, 25 Jul 2018 12:31:42 -0700 (PDT)
In-Reply-To: <CA+b+ERmLpWdzJT+qhgVVni9gruGyY33pkUa0nCrxh8aAU9cN+A@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CA+b+ERmfOaFMURD2eNPScs2SZ88rOEfGXZZJsqGDWX3M6bTY-g@mail.gmail.com> <0cb8f15b-7538-500c-dda3-915bf9814f94@gmail.com> <5D10C0C4-B93D-463F-A071-EEA6F35506CD@cisco.com> <CA+b+ERkqrr4Wr+Wy9q81SpyWi7H1s=z_RAvbc3Rbddvpgb7Xpg@mail.gmail.com> <44F647C7-BF88-469D-82C6-1509A57EAD31@gmail.com> <20180725155008.4yg4jkud6hsfdboh@faui48f.informatik.uni-erlangen.de> <CA+b+ERmLpWdzJT+qhgVVni9gruGyY33pkUa0nCrxh8aAU9cN+A@mail.gmail.com>
From: Greg Mirsky <gregimirsky@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Jul 2018 12:31:42 -0700
Message-ID: <CA+RyBmWn7kAVSE2aRiqePz8sOHtf=9XDFpMho_xbeGcLR+X1OA@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security
To: Robert Raszuk <robert@raszuk.net>
Cc: Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de>, RTGWG <rtgwg@ietf.org>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000b253cc0571d7ed59"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rtgwg/c-yTCKhb-OG8mdBTU2hMxsPCHbA>
X-BeenThere: rtgwg@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.27
Precedence: list
List-Id: Routing Area Working Group <rtgwg.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/rtgwg>, <mailto:rtgwg-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/rtgwg/>
List-Post: <mailto:rtgwg@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:rtgwg-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rtgwg>, <mailto:rtgwg-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 25 Jul 2018 19:31:50 -0000

Hi Robert,
great discussion, thank you.
I'd expect that the level of resource isolation and protection, guaranteed
or assured performance metrics will be applied as constraints and,
potentially, limit the use of the common infrastructure in favor of TE'd
and more controlled networks. For these premium services, as
Stewart suggested, different technologies, e.g., packet replication and
duplicate elimination, could be used.

Regards,
Greg

On Wed, Jul 25, 2018 at 9:34 AM, Robert Raszuk <robert@raszuk.net>; wrote:

> Agreed.
>
> And very honestly I am not sure if accomplishing high service robustness
> is best done via complicating any particular network or rather freedom to
> dynamically choose your end to end path among many cadidate and globally
> independent transports.
>
> That was what I meant by *wise* use of Internet in the former message.
>
> Vendor locking is as bad as operator's lock.
>
> Cheers,
> R.
>
> On Wed, Jul 25, 2018, 17:50 Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de>; wrote:
>
>> IMHO the main issue is that virtualization of networks and
>> any expectation of resource guarantees in the face of attacks opens
>> up a whole new slew of issues (attacks against shared infra)
>> which is today outside the scope of IETF focus because it does
>> not relate to our outdated definition of what qualifies for
>> IETF standardization.
>>
>> If we want to help create secure virtualized network services we
>> need to have a lot more opinions about box internal behaviors
>> even to the extent of defining standards about them. Vendors
>> will suck at this if left unsupervised.
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Jul 25, 2018 at 01:32:25PM +0100, Stewart Bryant wrote:
>> > Robert,
>> >
>> > Perhaps the right thing here is for you to propose text to Fred on how
>> to make sure his traffic is safe from the types of state-sponsored attack
>> that an air traffic system might need to withstand?
>> >
>> > Stewart
>> >
>> > > On 25 Jul 2018, at 13:24, Robert Raszuk <robert@raszuk.net>; wrote:
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > True network slicing for IP networks means either waist of resources
>> or very strict multi-level queuing at each hop and 100% ingress traffic
>> policing. Yet while this has a chance to work during normal operation at
>> the time of even regular failures this all pretty much melts like cheese on
>> a good sandwich.
>> > >
>> > > It is going to be very interesting to compare how single complex
>> sliced network compares for any end to end robust transport from N normal
>> simple IP backbones and end to end SLA based millisecond switch over
>> between one and another on a per flow basis. Also let's note then while the
>> former is still to the best of my knowledge a draft the latter is already
>> deployed globally in 100s of networks.
>> > >
>> > > Best,
>> > > R.
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >> On Wed, Jul 25, 2018 at 1:21 PM, Acee Lindem (acee) <acee@cisco.com>;
>> wrote:
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >> From: rtgwg <rtgwg-bounces@ietf.org>; on behalf of Stewart Bryant <
>> stewart..bryant@gmail.com>;
>> > >> Date: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 at 5:55 AM
>> > >> To: Robert Raszuk <robert@raszuk.net>;
>> > >> Cc: Routing WG <rtgwg@ietf.org>;
>> > >> Subject: Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >> On 25/07/2018 10:40, Robert Raszuk wrote:
>> > >>
>> > >> /* Adjusting the subject ... */
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >> ???Hello ???
>> > >>
>> > >> Stewart,
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >> ???You have made the below comment in the other thread we are
>> having: ???
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >> Indeed, I would have expected this to be on a secure network of some
>> sort either purely
>> > >> private or some form of VPN. However, I am sure I read in your text
>> that you were
>> > >> considering using the Public Internet much in the way of SD-WAN.
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >> ???Would you mind as extensively as you can expand on the above
>> statement ?
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >> Specifically on what basis do you treat say L2VPN or L3VPN of naked
>> unencrypted packets often traveling on the very same links as this "bad"
>> Internet traffic to be even slightly more secure then IPSEC or DTLS
>> encrypted SD-WAN carried data with endpoints being terminated in private
>> systems ?
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >> Thx,
>> > >>
>> > >> Robert
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >> Robert, I think that you have to take it as read that an air traffic
>> control SoF system is encrypting its packets. If it is not, then it is
>> clearly not fit for purpose.
>> > >>
>> > >> What concerns me is that an air traffic system is one of the most,
>> if not the most, high profile targets in civil society. You get reminded of
>> this each time you travel to IETF.
>> > >>
>> > >> The thing about safety of flight traffic is that a sustained and
>> effective DDoS attack has global impact in a way that few other such
>> attacks have.
>> > >>
>> > >> A VPN system ought to sustain resistance to such an attack better
>> than the proposed system which treats the SoF traffic the same as regular
>> traffic.
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >> I guess you are making a case for your network slicing work ????
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >> Acee
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >> - Stewart
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >
>>
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > rtgwg mailing list
>> > rtgwg@ietf.org
>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rtgwg
>>
>>
>> --
>> ---
>> tte@cs.fau.de
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> rtgwg mailing list
> rtgwg@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rtgwg
>
>