Stephen Farrell's No Objection on draft-ietf-rtgwg-bgp-routing-large-dc-11: (with COMMENT)

"Stephen Farrell" <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Thu, 16 June 2016 12:10 UTC

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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Stephen Farrell's No Objection on draft-ietf-rtgwg-bgp-routing-large-dc-11: (with COMMENT)
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Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-rtgwg-bgp-routing-large-dc-11: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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I would have liked to know a bit more about how these schemes
behave if some of the servers or say a ToR device in the DC are
considered as attackers e.g. having been compromised, but you
only mention attacks from outside the DC. I assume the answer is
to not accept servers as BGP speakers, but I'm not sure how you
do that reliably. And I also don't know whether or not ToR
devices are successfully attacked often.