Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security

Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de> Wed, 25 July 2018 15:50 UTC

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Date: Wed, 25 Jul 2018 17:50:09 +0200
From: Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de>
To: Stewart Bryant <stewart.bryant@gmail.com>
Cc: Robert Raszuk <robert@raszuk.net>, "rtgwg@ietf.org" <rtgwg@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security
Message-ID: <20180725155008.4yg4jkud6hsfdboh@faui48f.informatik.uni-erlangen.de>
References: <CA+b+ERmfOaFMURD2eNPScs2SZ88rOEfGXZZJsqGDWX3M6bTY-g@mail.gmail.com> <0cb8f15b-7538-500c-dda3-915bf9814f94@gmail.com> <5D10C0C4-B93D-463F-A071-EEA6F35506CD@cisco.com> <CA+b+ERkqrr4Wr+Wy9q81SpyWi7H1s=z_RAvbc3Rbddvpgb7Xpg@mail.gmail.com> <44F647C7-BF88-469D-82C6-1509A57EAD31@gmail.com>
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IMHO the main issue is that virtualization of networks and
any expectation of resource guarantees in the face of attacks opens
up a whole new slew of issues (attacks against shared infra)
which is today outside the scope of IETF focus because it does
not relate to our outdated definition of what qualifies for
IETF standardization.

If we want to help create secure virtualized network services we
need to have a lot more opinions about box internal behaviors
even to the extent of defining standards about them. Vendors
will suck at this if left unsupervised.


On Wed, Jul 25, 2018 at 01:32:25PM +0100, Stewart Bryant wrote:
> Robert,
> 
> Perhaps the right thing here is for you to propose text to Fred on how to make sure his traffic is safe from the types of state-sponsored attack that an air traffic system might need to withstand?
> 
> Stewart
> 
> > On 25 Jul 2018, at 13:24, Robert Raszuk <robert@raszuk.net>; wrote:
> > 
> > 
> > True network slicing for IP networks means either waist of resources or very strict multi-level queuing at each hop and 100% ingress traffic policing. Yet while this has a chance to work during normal operation at the time of even regular failures this all pretty much melts like cheese on a good sandwich. 
> > 
> > It is going to be very interesting to compare how single complex sliced network compares for any end to end robust transport from N normal simple IP backbones and end to end SLA based millisecond switch over between one and another on a per flow basis. Also let's note then while the former is still to the best of my knowledge a draft the latter is already deployed globally in 100s of networks. 
> > 
> > Best,
> > R.
> > 
> > 
> >> On Wed, Jul 25, 2018 at 1:21 PM, Acee Lindem (acee) <acee@cisco.com>; wrote:
> >>  
> >> 
> >>  
> >> 
> >> From: rtgwg <rtgwg-bounces@ietf.org>; on behalf of Stewart Bryant <stewart..bryant@gmail.com>;
> >> Date: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 at 5:55 AM
> >> To: Robert Raszuk <robert@raszuk.net>;
> >> Cc: Routing WG <rtgwg@ietf.org>;
> >> Subject: Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security
> >> 
> >>  
> >> 
> >>  
> >> 
> >>  
> >> 
> >> On 25/07/2018 10:40, Robert Raszuk wrote:
> >> 
> >> /* Adjusting the subject ... */
> >> 
> >>  
> >> 
> >> ???Hello ???
> >> 
> >> Stewart,
> >> 
> >>  
> >> 
> >> ???You have made the below comment in the other thread we are having: ???
> >> 
> >>  
> >> 
> >> Indeed, I would have expected this to be on a secure network of some sort either purely
> >> private or some form of VPN. However, I am sure I read in your text that you were
> >> considering using the Public Internet much in the way of SD-WAN.
> >> 
> >>  
> >> 
> >> ???Would you mind as extensively as you can expand on the above statement ? 
> >> 
> >>  
> >> 
> >> Specifically on what basis do you treat say L2VPN or L3VPN of naked unencrypted packets often traveling on the very same links as this "bad" Internet traffic to be even slightly more secure then IPSEC or DTLS encrypted SD-WAN carried data with endpoints being terminated in private systems ? 
> >> 
> >>  
> >> 
> >> Thx,
> >> 
> >> Robert
> >> 
> >> 
> >> Robert, I think that you have to take it as read that an air traffic control SoF system is encrypting its packets. If it is not, then it is clearly not fit for purpose.
> >> 
> >> What concerns me is that an air traffic system is one of the most, if not the most, high profile targets in civil society. You get reminded of this each time you travel to IETF.
> >> 
> >> The thing about safety of flight traffic is that a sustained and effective DDoS attack has global impact in a way that few other such attacks have. 
> >> 
> >> A VPN system ought to sustain resistance to such an attack better than the proposed system which treats the SoF traffic the same as regular traffic.
> >> 
> >>  
> >> 
> >> I guess you are making a case for your network slicing work ????
> >> 
> >>  
> >> 
> >> Acee
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> - Stewart
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> > 

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