RE: VPN security vs SD-WAN security

"Dongjie (Jimmy)" <> Sat, 28 July 2018 07:51 UTC

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From: "Dongjie (Jimmy)" <>
To: Robert Raszuk <>, "Acee Lindem (acee)" <>
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Subject: RE: VPN security vs SD-WAN security
Thread-Topic: VPN security vs SD-WAN security
Date: Sat, 28 Jul 2018 07:51:12 +0000
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Hi Robert,

IMO the two approaches are targeting at different use cases and customers.

The former (network slicing) is to provide the demanding services with guaranteed performance in a converged network, while the latter (switching between multiple paralleled networks) provides the customer with the best performance that is available among those candidates. To me the latter is still some kind of best effort, and as Toerless said, it depends on the diversity you can have in the multiple networks.

And I agree with Stewart on “you always pay a price for better than best effort.”

Best regards,

From: rtgwg [] On Behalf Of Robert Raszuk
Sent: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 8:24 PM
To: Acee Lindem (acee) <>;
Subject: Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security

True network slicing for IP networks means either waist of resources or very strict multi-level queuing at each hop and 100% ingress traffic policing. Yet while this has a chance to work during normal operation at the time of even regular failures this all pretty much melts like cheese on a good sandwich.

It is going to be very interesting to compare how single complex sliced network compares for any end to end robust transport from N normal simple IP backbones and end to end SLA based millisecond switch over between one and another on a per flow basis. Also let's note then while the former is still to the best of my knowledge a draft the latter is already deployed globally in 100s of networks.


On Wed, Jul 25, 2018 at 1:21 PM, Acee Lindem (acee) <<>> wrote:

From: rtgwg <<>> on behalf of Stewart Bryant <<>>
Date: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 at 5:55 AM
To: Robert Raszuk <<>>
Cc: Routing WG <<>>
Subject: Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security

On 25/07/2018 10:40, Robert Raszuk wrote:
/* Adjusting the subject ... */

​Hello ​

​You have made the below comment in the other thread we are having: ​

Indeed, I would have expected this to be on a secure network of some sort either purely
private or some form of VPN. However, I am sure I read in your text that you were
considering using the Public Internet much in the way of SD-WAN.

​Would you mind as extensively as you can expand on the above statement ?

Specifically on what basis do you treat say L2VPN or L3VPN of naked unencrypted packets often traveling on the very same links as this "bad" Internet traffic to be even slightly more secure then IPSEC or DTLS encrypted SD-WAN carried data with endpoints being terminated in private systems ?


Robert, I think that you have to take it as read that an air traffic control SoF system is encrypting its packets. If it is not, then it is clearly not fit for purpose.

What concerns me is that an air traffic system is one of the most, if not the most, high profile targets in civil society. You get reminded of this each time you travel to IETF.

The thing about safety of flight traffic is that a sustained and effective DDoS attack has global impact in a way that few other such attacks have.

A VPN system ought to sustain resistance to such an attack better than the proposed system which treats the SoF traffic the same as regular traffic.

I guess you are making a case for your network slicing work 😉


- Stewart