Re: [Rucus] SPIT from operator

"Charzinski, Joachim (NSN - DE/Munich)" <joachim.charzinski@nsn.com> Thu, 09 July 2009 07:01 UTC

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Date: Thu, 09 Jul 2009 09:01:30 +0200
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Thread-Topic: [Rucus] SPIT from operator
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From: "Charzinski, Joachim (NSN - DE/Munich)" <joachim.charzinski@nsn.com>
To: ext Pars Mutaf <pars.mutaf@gmail.com>, Rucus BoF <rucus@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Rucus] SPIT from operator
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Hi Pars,

> This makes me think that SPIT solutions must be operator independent.

I think this is generalizing too much. Solutions against the type of 
SPIT you mention will have to be operator independent (possibly also 
involving some regulatory power that forces operators to respect 
entries on "don't call" lists). The same will be true for the kind of 
Spam distribution services we find with the postal service ("distribute 
this to every household with a street address") - wherever the operator 
actually makes money from Spam or SPIT, it will be necessary to have an 
operator independent solution for fighting Spam and SPIT. 

On the other hand, it is probably the operators that are currently 
preventing large scale SPIT by performing ingress address filtering and 
enforcing rate caps on SIP signalling. Also, in a traditional telephony 
environment, it would be the operator that strips off the origin address 
for anonymous calls, so the operator has more power in filtering SPIT 
than the end user / end device would have. 

Therefore I think we need two solutions that help both parties - the 
operator and the end user - to fight SPIT independently. They may even 
cooperate, but they cannot completely substitute one another. 

> What is the situation in other countries? 

I am living in germany, and I used to get a lot of cold calls, most of 
them machine assisted but actually connecting to a personal agent. Only 
a few calls were completely automated. My cold calls frequency has dropped 
drastically since I started asking the callers for permission to record 
the calls for usage in court. They seem to have deleted my number from 
their address lists. 
If operators didn't interfer (see the above mentioned rate caps and 
address filters), we would probably get a lot more calls, as there are 
a lot of VoIP contracts around where you can reach most of the fixed 
phone network within a flat rate. 

Best regards

	Joachim. 


-----Original Message-----
From: rucus-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:rucus-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of ext Pars Mutaf
Sent: Wednesday, July 08, 2009 5:34 PM
To: Rucus BoF
Subject: [Rucus] SPIT from operator

Hello,

I my country, subscribers receive a lot of SPIT from their operators.
In my cell phone experience, the operator itself is the most serious
SPIT problem.

This makes me think that SPIT solutions must be operator independent.

Would you have any comments on that? What is the situation in other
countries? Which solutions can be applied?

Thanks

pars
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Joachim Charzinski

Nokia Siemens Networks
Research, Technology and Platforms 
Research & Technology / Network Evolution
 
St.-Martin-Str. 53
Post box: D-80240 Muenchen
D-81541 Muenchen
Germany
Tel: +49 89 636 79902

Joachim.Charzinski@nsn.com 
http://www.nokiasiemensnetworks.com/global/

Think before you print

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