Re: [Rum] [EXT] RUM security model

Brian Rosen <br@brianrosen.net> Fri, 16 October 2020 00:24 UTC

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From: Brian Rosen <br@brianrosen.net>
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2020 20:24:31 -0400
Message-ID: <CAOPrzE1ONDUcGwvcfRhpyu9YM5JJJD92AsLKaeXvXqH4fmNbBw@mail.gmail.com>
To: Paul Kyzivat <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu>
Cc: rum@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Rum] [EXT] RUM security model
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Nope, it just takes a hacker to create a piece of code that patches an app
to look like another app.

On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 8:19 PM Paul Kyzivat <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu> wrote:

> On 10/15/20 7:52 PM, Brian Rosen wrote:
> > I don’t think even that would work because there isn’t any way to know
> that the app that was approved is the app that is being used.
>
> Yes, I guess you are right. But at least it would require the end user
> to enter into a conspiracy with the app developers, and be able to get
> the credential out of one app and into another.
>
>         Thanks,
>         Paul
>
> > What systems like iOS does is rely on the fact that you can’t download
> and run an app that hasn’t been vetted. The code is signed and the
> signature is checked every time the app starts. We don’t have an
> environment like that.  We can’t control what is downloaded and we can’t
> check signatures.
>
> > I don’t think there is a reliable way to do this. If someone has an
> idea, please explain it, but we can’t be in a “you do something” position
> without a clue as to how.
> >
> > Now, if the app was an iOS app, then the right thing happens. There are
> few other systems that are wired down like that. Android, for example,
> allows you to download and run from arbitrary sites if the device is
> configured to allow that.
> >
> > Brian
> >
> >
> >> On Oct 15, 2020, at 6:30 PM, Paul Kyzivat <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu>
> wrote:
> >>
> >> Eugene,
> >>
> >>> On 10/15/20 3:30 PM, Eugene Christensen wrote:
> >>> Brian,
> >>> Admittedly I do not fully understand certificates and authentication
> but would client certificates or mutual authentication with a shared secret
> work here?
> >>
> >> I'm also not a security expert. To my understanding, the key problem is
> that you want a proof that an implementation has passed some sort of test.
> That is more or less equivalent to having a special certification authority
> that is able to assign a certificate based on the passing of a test. But
> for the system to work that certificate needs to be bound to the entity
> (hw/sw) that passed the test. It can't be possible to transfer that
> certificate to a different device.
> >>
> >> A possible alternative would be for each provider to have its own test
> service. When a user gets a new device/application, as part of the initial
> registration of their device with the provider, this test would be run.
> Then the result of that would be granting of credentials for that device to
> access that provider's system.
> >>
> >>     Thanks,
> >>     Paul
> >>
> >>> Thank you.
> >>> Eugene
> >>> *CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE.*This e-mail transmission, and any documents,
> files or previous e-mail messages attached to it, may contain confidential
> and proprietary information. If you are not the intended recipient, or a
> person responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are
> hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of any of
> the information contained in or attached to this message is STRICTLY
> PROHIBITED. If you have received this transmission in error, please
> immediately notify me by reply e-mail at echristensen@sorenson.com
> <mailto:echristensen@sorenson.com>or by telephone at +1 (801) 287-9419,
> and destroy the original transmission and its attachments without reading
> them or saving them to disk.
> >>> *From:* Brian Rosen <br@brianrosen.net>
> >>> *Sent:* Wednesday, September 30, 2020 5:47 PM
> >>> *To:* Eugene Christensen <echristensen@sorenson.com>
> >>> *Cc:* rum@ietf.org
> >>> *Subject:* Re: [Rum] [EXT] RUM security model
> >>> [EXTERNAL]
> >>> I think we understand why you want it. What we don’t understand is
> what mechanism would provide it. I am generally aware of this class of
> problem and I’m not aware of a solution that will work.  So what we need is
> a suggested mechanism that provides the assurance you want that is
> technically sound.
> >>> Brian
> >>> On Wed, Sep 30, 2020 at 6:30 PM Eugene Christensen <
> echristensen@sorenson.com <mailto:echristensen@sorenson.com>> wrote:
> >>>     Thanks for considering how we might implement this security
> >>>     mechanism.  May I add my voice that it is essential that we find an
> >>>     option for providing this desired security, whatever it is.  It
> >>>     could be detrimental to the VRS providers to have UAs out there,
> >>>     with the ability to register with VRS providers without first being
> >>>     fully vetted.  It is our practice anytime we make updates to our
> UAs
> >>>     to test how they work with our UAS before we ever release the new
> UA
> >>>     software into our production environment.  We only want UAs
> >>>     registering that have undergone this rigorous testing with our
> >>>     systems and then only with users which we have awareness of.
> >>>     Thanks,
> >>>     Eugene Christensen
> >>>     CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE. This e-mail transmission, and any
> documents,
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> >>>     intended recipient, or a person responsible for delivering it to
> the
> >>>     intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure,
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> >>>     or attached to this message is STRICTLY PROHIBITED. If you have
> >>>     received this transmission in error, please immediately notify me
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> >>>     reply e-mail at echristensen@sorenson.com
> >>>     <mailto:echristensen@sorenson.com> or by telephone at +1 (801)
> >>>     287-9419, and destroy the original transmission and its attachments
> >>>     without reading them or saving them to disk.
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