Re: [Rum] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-rum-rue-09: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org> Mon, 07 February 2022 21:13 UTC

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From: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>
To: Brian Rosen <br@brianrosen.net>
CC: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-rum-rue@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-rum-rue@ietf.org>, "rum-chairs@ietf.org" <rum-chairs@ietf.org>, "rum@ietf.org" <rum@ietf.org>, Paul Kyzivat <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu>
Thread-Topic: Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-rum-rue-09: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Date: Mon, 07 Feb 2022 21:12:42 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Rum] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-rum-rue-09: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Hi Brian!

Apologies for the delay.  Thank you for the edits in -10. They address my feedback.  I’ve cleared my ballot.  I missed the very clear text that was already at the start of Section 4 (in -09) which answered my second DISCUSS point about TLS.

Roman

From: Brian Rosen <br@brianrosen.net>
Sent: Thursday, January 20, 2022 9:54 AM
To: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>; draft-ietf-rum-rue@ietf.org; rum-chairs@ietf.org; rum@ietf.org; Paul Kyzivat <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu>
Subject: Re: Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-rum-rue-09: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Roman

Does the -10 version I submitted address your issues?

Brian



On Dec 23, 2021, at 4:56 PM, Brian Rosen <br@brianrosen.net<mailto:br@brianrosen.net>> wrote:

Thank you for your comments.  Responses inline


On Dec 15, 2021, at 5:07 PM, Roman Danyliw via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org<mailto:noreply@ietf.org>> wrote:

Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-rum-rue-09: Discuss

When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
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Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/blog/handling-iesg-ballot-positions/
for more information about how to handle DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.


The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-rum-rue/



----------------------------------------------------------------------
DISCUSS:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

** Is there a reason that credential re-use is being suggested as a fall back.
It seems risky to reuse the credentials across services.
This is really how sip services commonly work and I’m reluctant to disallow what is widely implemented


This fall-back also
appears to contradict the guidance in Section 5.1. which says “This
username/password combination SHOULD NOT be the same as that used for other
purposes, such as retrieving the RUE configuration”.
I will change this to add "except as expressly described below”
The configuration service is new, and thus we can say don’t reuse credentials for that.



See:

-- Section 7.1.  Per access to the CardDAV server, “[i]f no matching
credentials are configured, the RUE MUST use the SIP credentials from the
configuration.”

-- Section 9.2.2.  sip-password says “If it was never supplied, the password
used to authenticate to the configuration service is used for SIP, STUN and
TURN.”

-- Section 9.2.2.  carddav field says that “If username or password are not
supplied, the main account credentials are used. “

** Is there a reason that a minimum transport requirements of using HTTPS is
not defined for accessing the SIP-supporting elements of this architecture.
I’m confused by this.  HTTPS and SIP are mutually exclusive.  Did you mean TLS instead of HTTPS?
But you said “minimum transport” and not “security” so I’m even more confused.  Sorry.

We specify RFC7525 and 8446 in General Requirements for TLS.



-- Section 7.1.  Access to the CardDAV service?  Does the guidance in Section
7.2 (The RUE stores/retrieves the contact list (address book) by issuing an
HTTPS POST or GET request.) imply that?
There are two services: a contact list import and a CardDAV service, which is a contact sync.  Both are subject to the TLS requirements


-- Section 9.  Using the overall API? Does the guidance in Section 9.2 (A RUE
device may retrieve a provider configuration the using a simple HTTPs web
service) imply that?
Again it’s an HTTPS service, so subject to the General Requirements TLS specs


-- Section 9.2.1.  For the URI configuration options noted in this section
(e.g., the uri in signup)?
Same


** Section 11.  There are more than 10 20 normative SIP protocol references in
this document.  Which of their security considerations apply?
All of them.  That’s pretty normal sip stuff.



----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Thank you to Russ Mundy for the SECDIR review.

** Section 2.  Thanks for defining all of this terminology up front.  As many
of these are components in the architecture, I would have benefit from a
diagram early in the document showing how these components integrate. **
I am diagram challenged, but I will see what I can do.


Section 5.1.  The paragraph starting with “The registrar MAY authenticate using
SIP digest authentication …”, should likely say that the technique for
provisioning the credentials is out of scope for this profile.
Actually, they come in the configuration service.



** Section 8.  Typo. s/mechansism/mechanism/
Fixed


** Section 9.1
IANA has established a registry that contains
 a two letter country code and an entry point string.

Recommend adding a forward reference to Section 10.1.
Added



** Section 9.1.
 For example,
 if the entryPoint is "example.com<http://example.com/>", the provider list would be
 obtained from https://example.com/rum/V1/Providers.

This example doesn’t match the syntax of Section 9.3.  “V1” here and “v1” in
Section 9.3.
Fixed


** Section 9.2.  It would be helpful in this narrative text for the input
values names to match the actual field names used in the API in Section 9.3.
Specifically, “API Key” is “apiKey”, and “instance identifier” is “instanceId”
Fixed.



** Section 9.2.1.  Per the language value in the signup configuration option,
please provide a reference to the IAN language subtag registry
(https://www.iana.org/assignments/language-subtag-registry/language-subtag-registry).
I put it inline as a link.  Should it be an actual reference?



** Section 9.2.2.  sendLocationWithRegistation is listed as a stand-alone field
here, but in Section 9.3, it is shown to be part of the carddav object.  Which
is correct?
Ho, that’s an actual error.  It should be a separate field.  Fixed


** Section 9.2.3.  Figure 4.  This example is not conformance to the previously
described syntax.  All of the values of the “uri” fields should be a URI, but
all of them are missing a scheme.
Fixed



** Section 9.3.  [OpenAPI] needs to be a normative reference as its syntax is
needed to understand this section.
Reluctantly fixed.  We have too many normative references :)