Re: [Rum] RUM security model

Brian Rosen <br@brianrosen.net> Tue, 29 September 2020 12:58 UTC

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References: <159838856681.32208.2945571627178413540@ietfa.amsl.com> <E4141C48-64A1-4A34-81CD-2AFB098E411C@brianrosen.net> <eee4a662-9ccd-0ded-4639-76f5be34924b@alum.mit.edu> <a4a62f53-1571-56ec-35b9-7faecd4fa480@alum.mit.edu> <303CFB8D-1323-4237-8D84-91BF6201B6F5@brianrosen.net> <ce9be41c-381e-81c5-6b8d-e1feb34291ee@alum.mit.edu> <bafc0030-53c6-bb93-cdb1-587b042e78f5@alum.mit.edu> <EEABE6F0-1720-4279-AC4F-3DCB10B6724C@edvina.net>
In-Reply-To: <EEABE6F0-1720-4279-AC4F-3DCB10B6724C@edvina.net>
From: Brian Rosen <br@brianrosen.net>
Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2020 08:58:01 -0400
Message-ID: <CAOPrzE3QSBZHzpA1r5unPN7iqm1=TDUDesJfwRByz9LwVGnoSg@mail.gmail.com>
To: "Olle E. Johansson" <oej@edvina.net>
Cc: Paul Kyzivat <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu>, rum@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Rum] RUM security model
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While I personally think thats the way to go, most existing providers use
the existing registration mechanisms. If they were supportive of using
OAUTH2 instead, I would be VERY happy to make that change.

But that wouldn’t solve the problem we are discussing, which is how the RUE
device maintains credentials from multiple providers.  I suppose the
providers could use another provider as a identity provider for the
purposes of logging in their own customer, but that is even more remote
from where they are now.

Brian

On Tue, Sep 29, 2020 at 2:08 AM Olle E. Johansson <oej@edvina.net> wrote:

>
>
>
>
> > On 28 Sep 2020, at 21:33, Paul Kyzivat <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu> wrote:
>
> >
>
> > On 9/27/20 12:35 AM, Paul Kyzivat wrote:
>
> >> On 9/26/20 8:58 PM, Brian Rosen wrote:
>
> >>> I think we do want the spec to support multiple providers on one
> device/user.  I think that’s the point of having the file.  If it wasn’t
> them the user could just use the password for the single provider directly
> and not need any other mechanism.
>
> >>>
>
> >>> ISTM that if the user has a password (and possibly a second factor
> like a USB security device), then it can securely unlock a local resource
> that contains the credentials.  They can be stored encrypted, where the
> decrypt requires the passwords at least initially.
>
> >>>
>
> >>> The simplest model is perhaps too simple: a local encrypted file
> containing sign-on credentials that is decrypted with the user entering a
> password.  That is one password per user regardless of how many providers
> they use.
>
> >> Yes, I think it is too simple. The RUE needs access to those sign-on
> credentials in situations where the user isn't present. For instance,
> suppose it is restarted due to power failure. Then it must reregister ASAP
> in order to be available to receive incoming calls. There are lots of other
> cases as well.
>
> >
>
> > I definitely am not up to speed on the state of the art in this area. I
> wonder if we can recruit an expert to help. Perhaps request a security
> review.
>
> >
>
> I think RUM is a perfect use-case for the new Oauth2/OpenID Connect auth
> mechanism in SIP.
>
>
>
> /O
>
>
>
> --
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