Re: [saag] CFRG Presentation on Algebraic Eraser

"Derek Atkins" <derek@ihtfp.com> Wed, 25 March 2015 14:37 UTC

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Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2015 10:37:06 -0400
From: Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [saag] CFRG Presentation on Algebraic Eraser
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Hi,

On Wed, March 25, 2015 10:17 am, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 24, 2015 at 8:53 PM, Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com> wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> On Wednesday in CFRG my colleague and I are presenting the Algebraic
>> Eraser, a public key crypto system targeted at embedded, low-resource,
>> IoT
>> systems that performs 70-200x better than ECC in time and power
>> consumption.  If you're at all interested in seeing viable, performant
>> public key crypto on extremely constrained devices I encourage you to
>> attend CFRG at 1pm on Wednesday.
>>
>> The abstract of the talk:
>>
>> The Algebraic Eraser (AE), introduced by Anshel, Anshel, Goldfeld, and
>> Lemieux in 2006, is a key agreement protocol for public-key cryptography
>> which was designed to be suitable for implementation on low-cost
>> platforms
>> with constrained computational resources, such as RFID, NFC, and other
>> platforms associated with the "Internet of Things."  One novel feature
>> of
>> the protocol is that its complexityscales linearly with the desired
>> security, unlike other asymmetric methods such as RSA and ECC.  In this
>> talk we give an overview of the protocol and present recent hardware
>> timing data comparing the performance of AE with ECC.
>
> This protocol appears to be based on conjugation in the braid group,
> with some variations. I've seen http://arxiv.org/pdf/0801.4786v1.pdf
> attacking this proposal. Are there other analyses we should be looking
> at?

Sure.  You can look at http://arxiv.org/pdf/1202.0598v1.pdf and
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1105.1141v1.pdf which talk to the two proposed
attacks and show how they don't actually work.

Thanks,

> Sincerely,
> Watson Ladd

-derek
-- 
       Derek Atkins                 617-623-3745
       derek@ihtfp.com             www.ihtfp.com
       Computer and Internet Security Consultant