Re: [saag] A case against algorithm agility (long)
Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> Sun, 04 May 2014 12:35 UTC
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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [saag] A case against algorithm agility (long)
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On May 4, 2014, at 2:46 PM, ianG <iang@iang.org> wrote: > On 4/05/2014 04:10 am, Benjamin Kaduk wrote: > >> That there is even a >> commercial market for it suggests that they are in use, and not just by >> people who could by pass the crypto. > > > Yes, this is fascinating. There's also the SSL-interceptor boxes which > allegedly will take your commercially provided sub-Root. Who uses those > machines and why? These boxes are used for whatever purpose people want access to the plaintext for. Uses range from running so-called "next generation firewall”([1]) policy on them, to looking for dissidents in certain countries. Commercial CAs rarely give sub-root certificates, and when they do, they have name constraints ([2]), so they can’t be used for generating fake certificates for mail.google.com. These boxes generally either generate their own self-signed CA, or get a corporate sub-CA. Either way, it requires clients to be configured with the interception CA. Yoav [1] “next generation firewall” is a marketing term, but in general classic firewall can block addresses, protocols and ports, whereas “next generation” looks at higher layers as well. So a classic firewall can block your access to Facebook, a next-generation firewall can block your access to Farmville. [2] Yes, there were cases where this was not followed.
- [saag] A case against algorithm agility (long) ianG
- Re: [saag] A case against algorithm agility (long) Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [saag] A case against algorithm agility (long) ianG
- Re: [saag] A case against algorithm agility (long) Yoav Nir
- Re: [saag] A case against algorithm agility (long) Andrey Jivsov
- Re: [saag] A case against algorithm agility (long) S Moonesamy
- Re: [saag] A case against algorithm agility (long) Yoav Nir
- Re: [saag] A case against algorithm agility (long) ianG
- Re: [saag] A case against algorithm agility (long) S Moonesamy
- Re: [saag] A case against algorithm agility (long) Nico Williams
- Re: [saag] A case against algorithm agility (long) Paul Lambert
- Re: [saag] A case against algorithm agility (long) ianG
- Re: [saag] A case against algorithm agility (long) Paterson, Kenny
- Re: [saag] A case against algorithm agility (long) Nico Williams
- Re: [saag] A case against algorithm agility (long) Nico Williams
- Re: [saag] A case against algorithm agility (long) ianG
- Re: [saag] A case against algorithm agility (long) ianG
- Re: [saag] A case against algorithm agility (long) Mouse
- Re: [saag] A case against algorithm agility (long) Nico Williams