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Re: [saag] On PKI vs. Pinning (SAAG 108 preview)

"Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com> Tue, 28 July 2020 20:16 UTC

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, Ben Laurie <ben@links.org>
CC: IETF Security Area Advisory Group <saag@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [saag] On PKI vs. Pinning (SAAG 108 preview)
Thread-Index: AQHWZRM7mB0sp/K2t0aY7SH/G7K9X6kdpbOAgAABsICAAAHgAIAAAgeAgAADj4D//75nAA==
Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2020 20:14:30 +0000
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References: <20200728191331.GV41010@kduck.mit.edu> <e928e548-f82d-2809-200e-0fc4ac93db14@cs.tcd.ie> <20200728194235.GY41010@kduck.mit.edu> <1c4951d6-a67c-47c6-315e-2ad3776c94ec@cs.tcd.ie> <CAG5KPzx0RsYmS8E78Giz5we6bgOmwMvTUH6q_Qk-2gfSVFsLGg@mail.gmail.com> <b7a7fb62-6bba-b628-0d06-890f5211f85a@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [saag] On PKI vs. Pinning (SAAG 108 preview)
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>    I do think there's a role for pinning to CAs that you
    already gotta trust, as a way to fail rather than allow
    a MITM, for the cases where that's better.

I agree with this.

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