[saag] Fwd: Last Call: <draft-ietf-tsvwg-transport-encrypt-19.txt> (Considerations around Transport Header Confidentiality, Network Operations, and the Evolution of Internet Transport Protocols) to Informational RFC

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Wed, 10 February 2021 06:26 UTC

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Date: Tue, 09 Feb 2021 22:25:51 -0800
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: saag@ietf.org
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Subject: [saag] Fwd: Last Call: <draft-ietf-tsvwg-transport-encrypt-19.txt> (Considerations around Transport Header Confidentiality, Network Operations, and the Evolution of Internet Transport Protocols) to Informational RFC
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You may recall that this draft has a storied history, and that the results
of the third WGLC included adding a note for the IETF LC that the IETF
consensus (or lack thereof) is unknown and needs to be explicitly
determined for this draft
(https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/saag/PQfMkaORBJRE3zkKC8UfLv8JYhU/).

-Ben

On Fri, Feb 05, 2021 at 04:39:58PM -0800, The IESG wrote:
> 
> The IESG has received a request from the Transport Area Working Group WG
> (tsvwg) to consider the following document: - 'Considerations around
> Transport Header Confidentiality, Network
>    Operations, and the Evolution of Internet Transport Protocols'
>   <draft-ietf-tsvwg-transport-encrypt-19.txt> as Informational RFC
> 
> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
> comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
> last-call@ietf.org mailing lists by 2021-02-19. Exceptionally, comments may
> be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning
> of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.
> 
> Abstract
> 
> 
>    To protect user data and privacy, Internet transport protocols have
>    supported payload encryption and authentication for some time.  Such
>    encryption and authentication is now also starting to be applied to
>    the transport protocol headers.  This helps avoid transport protocol
>    ossification by middleboxes, mitigate attacks against the transport
>    protocol, and protect metadata about the communication.  Current
>    operational practice in some networks inspect transport header
>    information within the network, but this is no longer possible when
>    those transport headers are encrypted.
> 
>    This document discusses the possible impact when network traffic uses
>    a protocol with an encrypted transport header.  It suggests issues to
>    consider when designing new transport protocols or features.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The file can be obtained via
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tsvwg-transport-encrypt/
> 
> 
> 
> No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
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