Re: [saag] [pkix] Fwd: [therightkey] Certificate Transparency Working Group?
Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com> Thu, 06 September 2012 21:19 UTC
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From: Santosh Chokhani <SChokhani@cygnacom.com>
To: "denis.pinkas@bull.net" <denis.pinkas@bull.net>, "stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie" <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Date: Thu, 06 Sep 2012 17:19:30 -0400
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Fwd: [therightkey] Certificate Transparency Working Group?
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Cc: "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>, "wpkops@ietf.org" <wpkops@ietf.org>, "saag@ietf.org" <saag@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [saag] [pkix] Fwd: [therightkey] Certificate Transparency Working Group?
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Denis, As you may have seen my comment on this I-D and additions for security consideration, this extension does not provide the requisite transparency since anyone who has compromised the CA can put in their own OCSP pointer. That is the reason I want you to add the text in the "Security Considerations" section. From: pkix-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of denis.pinkas@bull.net Sent: Thursday, September 06, 2012 10:56 AM To: stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie Cc: pkix@ietf.org; wpkops@ietf.org; saag@ietf.org Subject: Re: [pkix] Fwd: [therightkey] Certificate Transparency Working Group? Part of the stated objective (i.e. verify the issuance of public X.509 certificates) is currently addressed, within the context of OCSP, in : https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-pinkas-2560bis-certinfo/ This draft is being considered within the PKIX WG. The second part of the objective (i.e. making all public issued certificates available to applications) may be dangerous in many situations. Denis -----pkix-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:-----pkix-bounces@ietf.org> a écrit : ----- A : "saag@ietf.org<mailto:saag@ietf.org>" <saag@ietf.org<mailto:saag@ietf.org>>, "'wpkops@ietf.org'" <wpkops@ietf.org<mailto:wpkops@ietf.org>>, pkix <pkix@ietf.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org>> De : Stephen Farrell Envoyé par : pkix-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org> Date : 06/09/2012 16:42 Objet : [pkix] Fwd: [therightkey] Certificate Transparency Working Group? Hi all, Please see below. Ben Laurie's looking to see if folks are interested in a BoF on Certificate Transparency for the IETF meeting in Altanta. Sean and I would be fine with that, if there's sufficient interest etc. Please follow up on therightkey@ietf.org<mailto:therightkey@ietf.org> if this is a topic that's of interest to you. Thanks, Stephen. -------- Original Message -------- Subject: [therightkey] Certificate Transparency Working Group? Date: Thu, 6 Sep 2012 15:32:05 +0100 From: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com<mailto:benl@google.com>> To: therightkey@ietf.org<mailto:therightkey@ietf.org> Would people be interested in starting a WG on Certificate Transparency? If so, how about a BoF in Atlanta? Here's a draft charter... CT IETF WG Draft Charter Objective Specify mechanisms and techniques that allow Internet applications to monitor and verify the issuance of public X.509 certificates such that all public issued certificates are available to applications, and each certificate seen by an application can be efficiently shown to be in the log of issued certificates. Furthermore, it should be possible to cryptographically verify the correct operation of the log. Optionally, do the same for certificate revocations. Problem Statement Currently it is possible for any CA to issue a certificate for any site without any oversight. This has led to some high profile mis-issuance of certificates, such as by DigiNotar, a subsidiary of VASCO Data Security International, in July 2011 (http://www.vasco.com/company/about_vasco/press_room/news_archive/2011/news_diginotar_reports_security_incident.aspx). The aim is to make it possible to detect such mis-issuance promptly through the use of a public log of all public issued certificates. Domain owners can then monitor this log and, upon detecting mis-issuance, take appropriate action. This public log must also be able to efficiently demonstrate its own correct operation, rather than introducing yet another party that must be trusted into the equation. Clients should also be able to efficiently verify that certificates they receive have indeed been entered into the public log. For revocations, the aim would be similar: ensure that revocations are as expected, that clients can efficiently obtain the revocation status of a certificate and that the log is operating correctly. Also, in both cases, the solution must be usable by browsers - this means that it cannot add any round trips to page fetches, and that any data transfers that are mandatory are of a reasonable size. _______________________________________________ therightkey mailing list therightkey@ietf.org<mailto:therightkey@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey _______________________________________________ pkix mailing list pkix@ietf.org<mailto:pkix@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
- [saag] Fwd: [therightkey] Certificate Transparenc… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [saag] [wpkops] [pkix] Fwd: [therightkey] Cer… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [saag] [pkix] Fwd: [therightkey] Certificate … Santosh Chokhani
- Re: [saag] [pkix] Fwd: [therightkey] Certificate … denis.pinkas