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Re: [saag] Section 2.9: was Re: AD review of draft-iab-crypto-alg-agility-06

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Thu, 03 September 2015 20:58 UTC

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Date: Thu, 03 Sep 2015 20:58:08 +0000
From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
To: IETF SAAG <saag@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [saag] Section 2.9: was Re: AD review of draft-iab-crypto-alg-agility-06
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On Thu, Sep 03, 2015 at 04:50:40PM -0400, Russ Housley wrote:

> Possible Alternative:
> 
>    Opportunistic security, like other reasons for encrypting traffic,
>    needs to make use of the strongest encryption algorithms that are
>    implemented and allowed by policy.  When communicating parties do
>    not have strong algorithms in common, using algorithms that are
>    weak against advanced attackers but sufficient against others is
>    one way to make pervasive surveillance significantly more difficult.

I can probably live with that.

-- 
	Viktor.

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