[saag] Considerations for Protocols with Compression over TLS

"KIHARA, Boku" <bkihara.l@gmail.com> Tue, 23 October 2012 14:29 UTC

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Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2012 23:29:13 +0900
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From: "KIHARA, Boku" <bkihara.l@gmail.com>
To: apps-discuss@ietf.org, saag@ietf.org
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Subject: [saag] Considerations for Protocols with Compression over TLS
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I'm writing a draft on cosiderations for protocols with compression over
TLS, since I was shocked by the CRIME attack.

What I want to say are:
* the CRIME attack may be applied if compression is applied in any form
* disabling TLS Compression and SPDY header compression is not a perfect
  solution; the threat has not gone!
* there should be some mitigations to take when using compression in TLS

Because I am neither a cryptographer nor a security expert there must
many mistakes in the draft in addition to language faults, but I think
it is good that we have some guides for comression in TLS.
Is IETF the write place to do such things?

Boku Kihara.