[saag] RSA-PSS
Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> Thu, 05 December 2013 11:16 UTC
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Date: Thu, 05 Dec 2013 13:16:00 +0200
From: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Cc: IETF SAAG <saag@ietf.org>
Subject: [saag] RSA-PSS
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Russ Housley writes: > We have seen very little movement toward RSA-PSS. While we are > reviewing algorithm choices in light of the pervasive surveillance > situation, I think we should take the time to consider improvements > in our algorithm choices. In the IPsecME WG we have draft-kivinen-ipsecme-signature-auth document which allows also using the RSASSA-PSS in addition to the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 in the IKEv2. Unfortunately I have not received that many reviews on the document, especially for the RSASSA-PSS parts. The RSASSA-PSS is quite a lot more complex than RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, especially with all the ASN.1 in the parameters etc, and I am not sure if the text I have written about it is correct. It would be useful if someone who is really familiar with RSASSA-PSS would review the draft... -- kivinen@iki.fi
- [saag] RSA-PSS Russ Housley
- [saag] RSA-PSS Tero Kivinen