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Re: [saag] Possible backdoor in RFC 5114

Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> Sat, 08 October 2016 13:38 UTC

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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 08 Oct 2016 06:37:24 -0700
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To: "Dang, Quynh" <quynh.dang@nist.gov>
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Subject: Re: [saag] Possible backdoor in RFC 5114
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On Oct 8, 2016 5:30 AM, "Dang, Quynh (Fed)" <quynh.dang@nist.gov> wrote:
>
> Watson and all,
>
> This paper would be a good (re)read:
http://www.math.uwaterloo.ca/~ajmeneze/publications/pqc.pdf.

>From which you would have us conclude what?

The backdoor of Gordon in Diffie-Hellman is well-known.  There is no way to
know if these primes are backdoored.

>
> Quynh.
>
> ________________________________________
> From: saag <saag-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Watson Ladd <
watsonbladd@gmail.com>
> Sent: Thursday, October 6, 2016 11:56 AM
> To: saag@ietf.org
> Subject: [saag] Possible backdoor in RFC 5114
>
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5114
>
> Let's review some publicly known facts:
>
> 1) BBN is a defense contractor
>
> 2) The NSA subverts crypto standards
>
> 3) It is possible to design primes so the discrete log problem is easy
>
> 4) The primes in RFC 5114 are not generated in verifiable manner: it
> is possible they
> are hidden SNFS primes.
>
> At minimum we should obsolete RFC 5114 in favor of primes generated in
> a verifiable manner. The fact that there already were primes for IKE
> use makes me wonder why this was even needed in the first place.
>
> Sincerely,
> Watson
>
> _______________________________________________
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> saag@ietf.org
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