[saag] Possible backdoor in RFC 5114

Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> Thu, 06 October 2016 15:56 UTC

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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 2016 08:56:45 -0700
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Subject: [saag] Possible backdoor in RFC 5114
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https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5114

Let's review some publicly known facts:

1) BBN is a defense contractor

2) The NSA subverts crypto standards

3) It is possible to design primes so the discrete log problem is easy

4) The primes in RFC 5114 are not generated in verifiable manner: it
is possible they
are hidden SNFS primes.

At minimum we should obsolete RFC 5114 in favor of primes generated in
a verifiable manner. The fact that there already were primes for IKE
use makes me wonder why this was even needed in the first place.

Sincerely,
Watson