Re: [saag] Revision of "Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes in Internet Protocols"

Mouse <mouse@Rodents-Montreal.ORG> Wed, 28 November 2012 21:32 UTC

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Subject: Re: [saag] Revision of "Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes in Internet Protocols"
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> Consider the case of an md5sum hash on a debian ISO image.  If the
> person responsible for generating the hash can create a malware-laden
> ISO imagine that has a hash collision with the actual ISO image,

...then you're dealing with second-preimage reisistance, not just
collision resistance.

At least, unless the "actual ISO image" creator is in on the deal, and
in that case even the best hash imaginable won't help.

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