Re: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue CA certificate

["Santosh Chokhani" <[e-mail]>]

As mentioned, self-signed roots have their own problems and hash is not
one of them.  They need other means to protect since signatures on them
are useless.

-----Original Message-----
From: [e-mail] [mailto:[e-mail]]
On Behalf Of RL 'Bob' Morgan
Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2008 4:18 PM
To: Paul Hoffman
Cc: [e-mail]; [e-mail]; [e-mail]; [e-mail]
Subject: Re: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue CA certificate



> Regardless of that, the authors of the MD5 paper are correct: trust 
> anchors signed with MD5 are highly questionable as of today (well, 
> actually, since they published their last paper). Hopefully, the 
> maintainers of the popular trust anchor repositories (Microsoft, 
> Mozilla, etc.) will yank out the trust anchors signed with MD5 (and 
> MD2!) as soon as possible.

This is a different claim than "CAs should stop issuing certs with MD5 
signatures", which is what I as an amateur take away from a quick scan
of 
the material.  Obviously MD5 is suspect in various ways, but does this
new 
work lead to the conclusion that MD5-signed roots are untrustworthy
today?
Replacing a root is a much bigger deal then changing signing practices.

  - RL "Bob"

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