[saag] Re: On path Active Attackers, and Meddlers in the Middle
Carsten Bormann <cabo@tzi.org> Mon, 06 January 2025 22:57 UTC
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From: Carsten Bormann <cabo@tzi.org>
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Date: Mon, 06 Jan 2025 23:57:06 +0100
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References: <173492140581.368793.2134938880856955223@dt-datatracker-65f549669d-2xld9> <31053.1734922088@obiwan.sandelman.ca> <CAMm+LwijiCJrp8E4inCqCG5gdT+eQnAAAo8oBebzBnzAY1rq3w@mail.gmail.com> <668E2661-ED74-47A3-8F93-EC83E902E9DE@tzi.org> <24107.1736114729@obiwan.sandelman.ca> <CABcZeBNnkaUTEk5ahLfTVRSCSZn-y2hHORVYUrWqpERngfPzUg@mail.gmail.com> <DC6F5CF1-26E0-4687-91A8-37A5C36EE7B9@icloud.com> <3306FD27-F79E-4F91-8F07-D56B9A039D93@deployingradius.com> <CAMm+LwhO=U7x+1rDxm4zggEREfnZkSUDx8XgZqoVUbCgaiaROA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
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CC: joncallas=40icloud.com@dmarc.ietf.org, Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, IETF SAAG <saag@ietf.org>
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Subject: [saag] Re: On path Active Attackers, and Meddlers in the Middle
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On 6. Jan 2025, at 23:52, Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com> wrote: > > Simpler AOPA like replay attacks or downgrade attacks are much easier to pull off. Replay attacks generally don’t need active on-path attack capability. Passive on-path suffices to catch the data to be replayed, and injection can then be from off-path. Grüße, Carsten
- [saag] On path Active Attackers, and Meddlers in … Michael Richardson
- [saag] Re: On path Active Attackers, and Meddlers… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [saag] Re: On path Active Attackers, and Meddlers… Carsten Bormann
- [saag] Re: On path Active Attackers, and Meddlers… Michael Richardson
- [saag] Re: On path Active Attackers, and Meddlers… Eric Rescorla
- [saag] Re: On path Active Attackers, and Meddlers… Michael Richardson
- [saag] Re: On path Active Attackers, and Meddlers… Michael Richardson
- [saag] Re: On path Active Attackers, and Meddlers… joncallas
- [saag] Re: On path Active Attackers, and Meddlers… Alan DeKok
- [saag] Re: On path Active Attackers, and Meddlers… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [saag] Re: On path Active Attackers, and Meddlers… Carsten Bormann
- [saag] Re: On path Active Attackers, and Meddlers… Michael Richardson
- [saag] Re: On path Active Attackers, and Meddlers… Peter Gutmann
- [saag] Re: On path Active Attackers, and Meddlers… Deb Cooley