Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Secrecy

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Mon, 23 March 2020 01:19 UTC

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Date: Sun, 22 Mar 2020 18:19:40 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Secrecy
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On Wed, Mar 18, 2020 at 09:38:07AM -0700, Jon Callas wrote:
> 
> We don't do "perfect" security in our fundamentals, because, as the unnamed AD said, it's hard to achieve.

For what little it's worth, the AD doesn't have to be unnamed; I'm happy to
own up to making the request of Bob.  I just haven't gotten fully caught up
on mail yet.

-Ben