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Re: [saag] Possible backdoor in RFC 5114

Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com> Thu, 06 October 2016 16:20 UTC

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From: Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 06 Oct 2016 12:10:40 -0400
Message-ID: <CAH8yC8mX_XhfOrY393-WSEJ2j6Pebj+2Mpim=6mOSXnDLL7Gdg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [saag] Possible backdoor in RFC 5114
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On Thu, Oct 6, 2016 at 11:56 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5114
>
> Let's review some publicly known facts:
>
> 1) BBN is a defense contractor
>
> 2) The NSA subverts crypto standards
>
> 3) It is possible to design primes so the discrete log problem is easy
>
> 4) The primes in RFC 5114 are not generated in verifiable manner: it
> is possible they
> are hidden SNFS primes.
>
> At minimum we should obsolete RFC 5114 in favor of primes generated in
> a verifiable manner. The fact that there already were primes for IKE
> use makes me wonder why this was even needed in the first place.

That gives me a sinking feeling because I have used them in
production. I want to say, "Oh f**k...".

If they are of special form, then how can it be tested or exposed. I'm
happy to purchase some Amazon compute time and run some extended
tests.

Jeff

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