Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Secrecy
Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com> Wed, 18 March 2020 16:01 UTC
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From: Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, Robert Moskowitz
<rgm-sec@htt-consult.com>, "saag@ietf.org" <saag@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Secrecy
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Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2020 16:01:30 +0000
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Subject: Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Secrecy
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Well, the paper https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/339.pdf does not use the term perfect, which I think is a good idea. Better to stop perpetuating a marketing word! Besides, forward secrecy has not alternative meaning to worry about. FWIW, I once presented to a bunch of quantum computing researchers, and blithely used the term "perfect" to which they strenuously, and logically, objected. Best regards, Dan > -----Original Message----- > From: saag <saag-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Salz, Rich > Sent: Wednesday, March 18, 2020 11:00 AM > To: Robert Moskowitz <rgm-sec@htt-consult.com>om>; saag@ietf.org > Subject: Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Secrecy > > > > Was the person who asked you to make the change a security person? > > > A Sec AD. > > That's disappointing. > > > Why I feel this ship has sailed. > > Agreed. > > > _______________________________________________ > saag mailing list > saag@ietf.org > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https- > 3A__www.ietf.org_mailman_listinfo_saag&d=DwICAg&c=yzoHOc_ZK-sxl- > kfGNSEvlJYanssXN3q-lhj0sp26wE&r=qkpbVDRj7zlSRVql- > UonsW647lYqnsrbXizKI6MgkEw&m=9ySHXHCknogS_OBxHFmfhiP5HybmGnP1 > ARI20jDHdxA&s=YAzeZGV0OLBWM983ddGInWmM4YdxVxg46aKgNpcLDEU&e > = ---------------------------------------------------------------------- This transmission (including any attachments) may contain confidential information, privileged material (including material protected by the solicitor-client or other applicable privileges), or constitute non-public information. Any use of this information by anyone other than the intended recipient is prohibited. If you have received this transmission in error, please immediately reply to the sender and delete this information from your system. Use, dissemination, distribution, or reproduction of this transmission by unintended recipients is not authorized and may be unlawful.
- [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Secrecy Robert Moskowitz
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Salz, Rich
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Robert Moskowitz
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Christopher Wood
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Salz, Rich
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Nico Williams
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Dan Brown
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Nico Williams
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Mark D. Baushke
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Jon Callas
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Christopher Wood
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Nico Williams
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Hao, Feng
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Nico Williams
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Dan Brown
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Robert Moskowitz
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… John Mattsson