Re: [saag] Discovery: can it be solved

David Schinazi <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com> Tue, 16 November 2021 21:25 UTC

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From: David Schinazi <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2021 13:25:15 -0800
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Subject: Re: [saag] Discovery: can it be solved
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I don't see any value in standardizing discovery of privacy-related
services.
When a client device (a user agent, if you will) ships a feature that is
marketed at improving user privacy, the vendor makes some promises to its
users. For example, it could say "your IP address is hidden from websites".
The vendor needs to follow through on that claim, and the way it does that
is
by using specific proxies that it trusts. If the vendor is fancy, it might
even build
a two-hop system with some cool privacy properties - but those properties
still
rely on the contractual agreements the vendor has with the other proxy
operators.
The vendor simply isn't going to let the local network recommend a proxy
provider,
because then the vendor would be lying to its users.

David

On Tue, Nov 16, 2021 at 5:15 AM Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
wrote:

>
> Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net> wrote:
>     > The questions here are more fundamental.  What security basis do we
>     > have for clients retrieving critical information from the network?
> How
>     > does that affect the security of those clients? How might that shape
>     > how the services that are discovered can be deployed? What does that
> do
>     > to the diversity of those services?
>
> I think that this is a pretty good question.
>
> 1) IoT LLN networks would like to avoid multicast, and so we have a move
> from
>    multicast everything to register.
>
> 2) It's not a big-yellow-coax anyway, multicast is not real (its emulated),
>    MLD is broken in many places, we can't continue to play L2 tricks.
>    We need to acknowledge the real L1 topology, and we can do this in IPv6.
>
> 3) SEND failed due to lack of network/node/node trust relationships.
>
> 4) How many temporary addresses can the network sustain for each node?
>    We have no way in current RA/RS ND/NA for the routers to put any kind
>    of limit, and we already have documents that deal with pre-populating
>    NCE in routers to lower latency on initial connections.
>    If nodes need to register, then maybe the authentication can be mutual.
>
>     > At some level, the question of IP intermediation (aka routing) has
> been
>     > solved.  We assume virtually nothing from IP forwarding and routing,
>     > but also expect very little from those providing that service.
>
> I don't really agree with this statement.  I don't think it's been solved.
> I think that we have paved over this relationship (think: little child with
> fingers in their ears.... "I can't hear you"), and it's exactly this
> relation
> that we need to fix.
>
> --
> Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>   . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
>            Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide
>
>
>
>
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