Re: [saag] ASN.1 vs. DER Encoding

Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com> Tue, 23 April 2019 05:08 UTC

Return-Path: <hallam@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: saag@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: saag@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 70AAE120147 for <saag@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 22 Apr 2019 22:08:24 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.645
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.645 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN=0.25, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H3=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=no autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id j14s6M50aR1z for <saag@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 22 Apr 2019 22:08:22 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-ot1-f54.google.com (mail-ot1-f54.google.com [209.85.210.54]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 958581200CD for <saag@ietf.org>; Mon, 22 Apr 2019 22:08:22 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-ot1-f54.google.com with SMTP id f23so2532219otl.9 for <saag@ietf.org>; Mon, 22 Apr 2019 22:08:22 -0700 (PDT)
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=Z7QRymurBLPeNLQuLe/rVd9Y63W0inUBRlImAPm4xKI=; b=SzfLMAQxBgqVDRmY5MLMvXewGprbz5YpgnoRph1kO+2Wy+Rj7VlpO7cH4wp1BayqcX n1nSdAGTQivgnzxLRlxm5T9lysN2NCrmo+utg/T0ihd+oFbXJ7yYdEKyJLn6lBxV36Xk Ndc+iQpCWXyKG210USpofh76PGhL9E41taytajvtRbdxsBGkMXmNXYRKyHTn6ZbPu+8m ob7dGTSTPNaPrdxOK9a4ry3kaRYTqELfZqXLgN5wJ3r2u3rSom16x1ElGrNudB9YkVuS krUNIorq26dDuqywezJY0Xlua5+f4QAC+lZC2KU+M6U+q4YoKbXg6pTKSAJZyoOys8Tg bC/w==
X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAW7jw5vXUKCg8gtqgiKkvIg/uULf5jeYSnBc8ZCgs+jc4rCWynU mFT2s0mWYDMdhqWMXn8zQVBPP5NDSU7KeI55fHg=
X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqw13QdMj976g5X87XIa5oH0DWhOwmHa4Js5Jd8OYkGWaFyDmkWoFgNNUHfkVyrRCyvfmjRhEpU1qnlFiG5A09k=
X-Received: by 2002:a9d:58c5:: with SMTP id s5mr13136931oth.361.1555996101795; Mon, 22 Apr 2019 22:08:21 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <20190326214816.GB4211@localhost> <1553679912618.8510@cs.auckland.ac.nz> <20190327151545.GG4211@localhost> <20190330153101.GT35679@kduck.mit.edu> <C3D9DD15-AB23-4B42-BA61-A4E4CD826B77@huitema.net> <F6387640-20F3-4B3C-8E61-58CAF7828CA1@tzi.org> <269bee5d-e225-3484-04ed-3e5de6c19081@cs.tcd.ie> <CAMm+Lwi1pNje_9HMYnf-gQN8scggQDTUB0z0uCsy9trtaYKBsg@mail.gmail.com> <20190422211449.GD3137@localhost> <233FB845-976C-49CA-ADA6-C97035A2426F@vigilsec.com> <20190423035415.GG3137@localhost> <CACsn0cnD15QX2tOPg20XNnfHSbHOY3BTnqSiyKEB=7zQyTGaLQ@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CACsn0cnD15QX2tOPg20XNnfHSbHOY3BTnqSiyKEB=7zQyTGaLQ@mail.gmail.com>
From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2019 01:08:11 -0400
Message-ID: <CAMm+LwiLiBb+O=4Tq_WWp7Car4JW_cRBgHcSU6Zh+Eyxh-Oy9A@mail.gmail.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Cc: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>, IETF SAAG <saag@ietf.org>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000eb67dc05872b92b5"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/saag/eoYrD65dh9eZFDnQCBMDvtkv9kQ>
Subject: Re: [saag] ASN.1 vs. DER Encoding
X-BeenThere: saag@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: Security Area Advisory Group <saag.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/saag>, <mailto:saag-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/saag/>
List-Post: <mailto:saag@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:saag-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag>, <mailto:saag-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2019 05:08:25 -0000

On Tue, Apr 23, 2019 at 12:03 AM Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 8:54 PM Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 07:54:52PM -0400, Russ Housley wrote:
> > > > And x.400/x.500 naming is an awful disaster.
> > >
> > > They are not the same.  Once can completely avoid X.400 names, but the
> >
> > They are not, but they are similar, and similarly difficult to use.
> >
> > > X.500 one are used in certificates.  I strongly encourage people to
> > > keep it simple.  The bits on the wire sitll get too complicated, but
> > > the code can mostly do exact match processing.
> >
> > To keep it simple means to leave the subjectName empty and use dNSName
> > and rfc822Name SANs instead wherever possible.
> >
> > Naming is more than half the battle.  Internet-style naming of things
> > won long, long ago.  It's not just that users can handle domainnames and
> > name@domainname syntax but not x.500, but that x.500 naming is
> > fiendishly difficult to handle in code, or even in specs -- there's not
> > even a lossless textual representation of x.500 names [RFC4514]!
>
> Let us not forget the valiant battle to enforce the requirements that
> CAs know that Bremerhaven is in Bremen and not in Niedersachsen. I
> await the discovery that a small company in Baarle-Hertzog is actually
> three feet across the border, with dire consequences for the web PKI.
> (If the border moves and you don't, does the certificate need
> revocation? Or what about countries being renamed?)
>

The only circumstance in which geography is usually significant in the
WebPKI is when the certificate is EV or OV which are supposed to provide a
degree of accountability.

If you register a business in Germany, or for that matter you merely
purport to hold said registration, you are accepting a certain degree of
accountability under German law.

If you are using a DV certificate and selling fraudulent goods, you may
have customers in 100 different countries, none of which consider you to be
their problem in particular.

If you are using an EV certificate and it says Germany, well we certainly
have a nexus in that particular country and their police are more inclined
to investigate the fraud and hold the perpetrators accountable if possible.

The original design brief for the WebPKI was limited to making online
commerce no less safe than bricks and mortar stores.