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Re: [saag] Interest COVID-19 'passport' standardization?

Dirk-Willem van Gulik <dirkx@webweaving.org> Mon, 02 August 2021 13:24 UTC

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From: Dirk-Willem van Gulik <dirkx@webweaving.org>
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Date: Mon, 2 Aug 2021 15:21:12 +0200
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Subject: Re: [saag] Interest COVID-19 'passport' standardization?
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On 2 Aug 2021, at 14:55, Henry Story <henry.story@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On 2. Aug 2021, at 14:36, Dirk-Willem van Gulik <dirkx@webweaving.org> wrote:
>>> In the end we are all going to get it: vaccines rollouts are indeed aiming 
>>> at doing just that. So that is why I would not be that worried about privacy 
>>> with such Credentials. 
>> 
>> While I would Agee in theory - I think we have quite a while to go to create VC’s that are sufficiently resistant against surveillance; including surveillance by the issuing entity.
> 
> Ah yes, one would like to be able to use the credential without the issuer knowing
> that one has presented it. 
> 
> The Self Sovereign Identity book [1] - which really helps give a good overview of 
> the area - has quite a lot to say on how the architecture they 
> have built up to stop the issuer needing to know about the use of the credential.
> There is talk of zero knowledge proof, etc…

Which is what the Netherlands has opted to doo - based on the excellent work by Idemix and the IRMA implementation*.

Dw.

*: which we could not use ‘as is’ - as it needed to be fully offline too.

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