Re: [saag] AD review of draft-iab-crypto-alg-agility-06

One spelling nit:

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> writes:

> I'm trying to address both comments with this proposal:
>
> 2.6.  Preserving Interoperability
>
>    Cryptographic algorithm deprecation is very difficult.  People do not
>    like to introduce interoperability problems, even to preserve
>    security.  As a result, flawed algorithms are supported for far too
>    long.  The impact of legacy software and long support tails on
>    security can be reduced by making it easy to transition from old
>    algorithms and suites to new ones.  Social pressure is often needed
>    to cause the transition to happen.
>
>    Implementers have been reluctant to remove deprecated algorithms or
>    suites from server software, and server administrators have been
>    reluctant to diable them over concerns that some party will no longer
--------------------^

This should be "disable", not "diable".

>    have the ability to connect to their server.  Implementers and
>    administrators want to improve security by using the best supported
>    algorithms, but their actions are tempered by the desire to preserve
>    connectivity.  Recently, some browser vendors have started to provide
>    visual warnings when a deprecated algorithm or suite is used.  These
>    visual warnings provide a new incentive to transition away from
>    deprecated algorithms and suites.
>
>    Transition in Internet infrastructure is particularly difficult.  The
>    digital signature on the certificate for an intermediate
>    certification authority (CA) [RFC5280] is often expected to last
>    decades, which hinders the transition away from a weak signature
>    algorithm or short key length.  Once a long-lived certificate is
>    issued with a particular signature algorithm, that algorithm will be
>    used by many relying parties, and none of them can stop supporting it
>    without invalidating all of the subordinate certificates.  In a
>    hierarchical system, many subordinate certificates could be impacted
>    by the decision to drop support for a weak signature algorithm or an
>    associated hash function.
>
>    Institutions, being large or dominant users within a large user base,
>    can assist by coordinating the demise of an algorithm suite, making
>    the transition easier for their own users as well as others.
>
> Russ

-derek

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>

-- 
       Derek Atkins                 617-623-3745
       derek@ihtfp.com             www.ihtfp.com
       Computer and Internet Security Consultant