Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Secrecy
"Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com> Wed, 18 March 2020 14:48 UTC
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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To:
Robert Moskowitz <rgm-sec@htt-consult.com>, "saag@ietf.org" <saag@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Secrecy
Thread-Index: AQHV/TLqTHSW60AdJUaA8tliUwKoBqhObiQA
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2020 14:48:22 +0000
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Subject: Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Secrecy
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Was the person who asked you to make the change a security person? Can you ask them for a rationale? I agree perfect forward secrecy is the term of art and we shouldn't create a new one.
- [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Secrecy Robert Moskowitz
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Salz, Rich
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Robert Moskowitz
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Christopher Wood
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Salz, Rich
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Nico Williams
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Dan Brown
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Nico Williams
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Mark D. Baushke
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Jon Callas
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Christopher Wood
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Nico Williams
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Hao, Feng
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Nico Williams
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Dan Brown
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… Robert Moskowitz
- Re: [saag] Perfect Forward Secrecy vs Forward Sec… John Mattsson