Re: [saag] AD review of draft-iab-crypto-alg-agility-06

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Wed, 02 September 2015 21:34 UTC

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Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2015 21:34:51 +0000
From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: Re: [saag] AD review of draft-iab-crypto-alg-agility-06
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On Wed, Sep 02, 2015 at 05:18:10PM -0400, Russ Housley wrote:

> How about:
> 
>    It may seem as if the ability to use an algorithm of one's own
>    choosing is very desirable; however, the selection is often better
>    left to experts.  When there are choices, end-users might select
>    between configuration profiles that have been defined by experts.

Super.

>    Further, experts need not specify each and every cryptographic
>    algorithm alternative.  Specifying all possible choices will not lead
>    to them being available in every implementation.

That's fine.

> I suggest:
> 
>    In addition, inclusion of too many alternatives may
>    add complexity to algorithm selection or negotiation.  Specification
>    of  too many alternatives will likely hamper interoperability and may
>    hamper security as well.  When specifying new algorithms or suites,
>    protocol designers would be prudent to consider whether existing
>    ones can be deprecated.

Fine.

-- 
	Viktor.