Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue CAcertificate

[Yoav Nir <[e-mail]>]

On Jan 4, 2009, at 9:11 PM, Paul Hoffman wrote:

> At 9:02 AM +0200 1/4/09, Yoav Nir wrote:
>> Best we can do is to get the CAs to
>>
>> (1) not issue MD5 certs anymore and
>> (2) randomize the serial number and/or
>> (3) and a random fluff extension that people are talking about
>
> Just to repeat it one more time: #3 does not prevent the published  
> attack.

It does if the random fluff is inserted by the CA. The attack depends  
on their ability to predict the entire TBS part.

>> But still, I don't see Microsoft removing a root CA because one of  
>> their sub-CAs is issuing non-compliant certificates.
>
> It is hard to see Microsoft removing or adding CAs. If anyone knows  
> of a public interface (mailing list, web site, whatever) for when  
> this happens, by all means please the world know.

I managed to find a page with their policy on adding new root CAs.  
Nothing there about removing old root CAs.

>> And if Microsoft don't, nobody else will. The Firefox/Opera/Safari/ 
>> Chrome people don't want any sites that "only work with Explorer".
>
> At least with respect to Firefox, I think that statement is false.

They've done quite a bit to render broken sites that were made for IE.  
Also, I've updated today and all the "bad" CAs with MD5 signatures are  
still in the TAS.

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