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Re: [saag] AD review of draft-iab-crypto-alg-agility-06

Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com> Mon, 20 July 2015 03:10 UTC

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From: Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
To: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
References: <55A938F1.9090404@cs.tcd.ie> <CD936D80-BEA2-4918-828C-E3A392761EC5@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2015 19:24:00 -0400
In-Reply-To: <CD936D80-BEA2-4918-828C-E3A392761EC5@gmail.com> (Kathleen Moriarty's message of "Sat, 18 Jul 2015 10:30:19 +0200")
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Subject: Re: [saag] AD review of draft-iab-crypto-alg-agility-06
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Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> writes:

>> 2.9: I'm not really a fan of blessing weaker algs for OS, but I lost
>> that argument before. I wonder if we would get consensus if this
>> said that weak algs are better than no encryption but still MUST be
>> deprecated as soon as feasible?
>
> I don't think we've really debated this enough to get consensus.  I
> don't think weaker algs fit into our agreed definitions for OS.  I
> just recall your debate with Pete on another draft, but think a wider
> debate is needed to see what the consensus is.  I don't think weaker
> algorithms should fit into the definition.

What seems like a good algorithm today may become a weaker algorithm
tomorrow.  Similarly, a new, better algorithm may appear next week.  So
while I think we can all agree that no, we shouldn't use 1DES today, we
don't know if next week someone will find an attack against AES-128 or
ECC-P256.  What I'm saying that that qualifying "strong" and "weak" is,
unfortunately, a more subjective (vs objective) process.

> Best regards,
> Kathleen

-derek
-- 
       Derek Atkins                 617-623-3745
       derek@ihtfp.com             www.ihtfp.com
       Computer and Internet Security Consultant

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