[saag] Comment on open source Re: keys under doormats: is our doormat ok?

Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com> Thu, 16 July 2015 14:16 UTC

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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Cc: Dave Crocker <dcrocker@bbiw.net>, "saag@ietf.org" <saag@ietf.org>
Subject: [saag] Comment on open source Re: keys under doormats: is our doormat ok?
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On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 4:11 PM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
wrote:

>
> Tend to agree. It's also addressing export of course but were any
> of the recently mooted government silliness to become real, it'd
> also have to involve controls on export/import as well as on usage
> so that part of the analysis is actually still relevant I figure.
> (There'd be an even bigger and even sillier impact on open source
> the importance of which is nowadays probably better appreciated.)
>

I don't think it is the importance of open source in general that has
changed. The difference is that the portion of the stack where the crypto
usually lives is no longer the portion that is proprietary and competitive.
Even the commercial applications are based on code which is open source.
Microsoft just put the whole of the .NET framework up on github under an
MIT license.

Managing a computer in a way that provides sufficient security to protect
my stuff is fairly straightforward. Managing a computer in a way that
provides sufficient security for other people's stuff is very hard. There
is liability to be considered. There have to be audits.

The best way to design a system therefore is to avoid becoming a trusted
service if at all possible and limit the degree of trust other parties have
to put on your system.

The fatal flaw with mandated lawful access is that the only way I can
design a system that allows me to guarantee access for Mr Plod or Mr Spook
is by designing the system in a way that allows my own employees to perform
similar abuse.