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Tue, 18 Aug 2026 08:53:49 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: In-Reply-To: From: Nathanael Ritz Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2026 09:53:35 -0600 X-Gm-Features: AcwNN1VigcOrd8quUsCEqEqho1PQ9vUYXlIwYA6P_c0I95FKcKhjVr4e0_X5tks Message-ID: To: seat@ietf.org Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000f2f8960659544a97" Message-ID-Hash: LPOID2APZRRCFNGPBS3VQ564HUEWTTZ5 X-Message-ID-Hash: LPOID2APZRRCFNGPBS3VQ564HUEWTTZ5 X-MailFrom: nathanritz@gmail.com X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; emergency; loop; banned-address; member-moderation; nonmember-moderation; administrivia; implicit-dest; max-recipients; max-size; news-moderation; no-subject; digests; suspicious-header X-Mailman-Version: 3.3.9rc6 Precedence: list Subject: =?utf-8?q?=5BSeat=5D_Re=3A_Updated_Attacker_Model_in_SEAT_Use_Cases_Draft?= List-Id: "Secure Evidence and Attestation Transport (SEAT) WG" Archived-At: List-Archive: List-Help: List-Owner: List-Post: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: --000000000000f2f8960659544a97 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi, some comments inline with [NR]: On Tue, 18 Aug 2026 at 07:16, Chengxin Huang wrote= : > [SNIP] I agree with Songbo that CVE-2026-33697 must be added. I also > suggest to add a pointer to [Edgeless] advisory in attacker model. Both a= re > wildly exploited and I don't see how proposed text covers both. > On Tue, Aug 18, 2026 at 4:09=E2=80=AFPM Songbo Bu w= rote: > [...] On CVE-2026-33697: This is already exploited in the wild. >> > [NR]: Despite repeated assersions of 'wild exploitation', SEAT recently had another independent researcher stop by and specifically state that that they "have not, however, been able to find a publicly available, concrete exploitation trace or proof-of-concept demonstrating how the attack can be carried out against the actual CoCoS implementation." [0] My own search has found a specific PoC for specific regressions related to new CVE candidates including a post-TLS authenticator handshake example [1], but such concrete tooling seems to appear in isolation. Finally, I think it's also worth noting that NIST [2] appears to give CVE-2026-33697 an exploitability score of 1.0 [3] and it appears Github suggests an exploitability score of 1.1 for the same [4]. On Tue, Aug 18, 2026 at 4:09=E2=80=AFPM Songbo Bu w= rote: > Therefore, please make it explicit in the threat model. I don't think >> "cross-connection replay" is a standard term in the literature. I think >> CVE-2026-33697 is related to relay and not "cross-connection replay". >> Therefore, as a first step, making it explicit in the draft is useful fo= r >> further discussion. >> > [NR]: If we are uncertain if we think CVE-2026-33697 is related to relay and not 'cross-connection replay' or not, I suggest such details get narrowed down before being put into the draft. Based on the sources, I believe we should consider the practical impact of "Key Exchange without Entity Authentication" and "Origin Validation Error" from first principles. This is not because these are new risks, but because they are well established in prior literature and represent long-standing concerns for secure transport protocols. The mailing list is the right place to continue these discussions. On Tue, Aug 18, 2026 at 4:09=E2=80=AFPM Songbo Bu w= rote: > [SNIP] On cross-connection replay handling: I think we can agree on >> desired handling in this draft and solutions can then implement this. >> > tirumal reddy =E4=BA=8E2026=E5=B9=B48=E6=9C=8818=E6=97= =A5=E5=91=A8=E4=BA=8C 14:26=E5=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A > On cross-connection replay: how a solution detects and handles it (abort > or otherwise) is a separate discussion for the solution drafts, not this > document. > [NR]: As such, I agree with Tiru on the direction with this. Cheers, Nathanael [0] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/QD8QB1WVL-toNovGQ2Tk6DmmeEM/ [1] https://github.com/B1ueD0g/cocos-cve-regression-evidence [2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33697 [3] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator?name=3DCVE-2026-33697&= vector=3DAV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N&version=3D3.1&source=3DNIST [4] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator?name=3DCVE-2026-33697&= vector=3DAV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N&version=3D3.1&source=3DGitHub,= %20Inc . --000000000000f2f8960659544a97 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi, some comments inline with [NR]:

On Tue, 18 Aug 2026 at 07:16, Chengxin Huang <aurestarnull@gmail.com> wrote:
[SNIP] I agree w= ith Songbo that CVE-2026-33697 must be added. I also suggest to add a point= er to [Edgeless] advisory in attacker model. Both are wildly exploited and = I don't see how proposed text covers both.
=C2=A0
On Tue, Aug 18, 2026 at 4:09=E2=80=AFPM Songbo = Bu <bluedognull@gmail.com> wrote:
[...] = On CVE-2026-33697: This is already exploited in the wild.

[NR]: Despite repeated assersions of &#= 39;wild exploitation', SEAT recently had another independent researcher= stop by and specifically state that that they "have not, however, been able to find a publicly avai= lable, concrete=C2=A0ex= ploitation trace or proof-of-concept demonstrating how the attackcan be carried out against the actual CoCoS implementation." [0] My= own search has found a specific PoC for specific regressions related to ne= w CVE candidates including a post-TLS authenticator handshake example [1], = but such concrete=C2=A0tooling seems to appear in isolation. Finally, I thi= nk it's also worth noting that NIST [2] appears to give CVE-2026-33697 = an exploitability score of 1.0 [3] and it appears Github suggests an exploi= tability score of 1.1 for the same [4].

On Tue, Aug 18, 2026 at 4:09=E2=80=AFPM Songbo Bu <bluedognull@gmail.com> wrote:
Therefore, please mak= e it explicit in the threat model. I don't think "cross-connection= replay" is a standard term in the literature. I think CVE-2026-33697 = is related to relay and not "cross-connection replay". Therefore,= as a first step, making it explicit in the draft is useful for further dis= cussion.

[NR]: If w= e are uncertain if we think CVE-2026-33697 is related to relay and not '= ;cross-connection replay' or not, I suggest such details get narrowed d= own before being put into the draft. Based on the sources, I believe we sho= uld consider the practical impact of "Key Exchange without Entity Auth= entication" and "Origin Validation Error" from first princip= les. This is not because these are new risks, but because they are well est= ablished in prior literature and represent long-standing concerns for secur= e transport protocols. The mailing list is the right place to continue thes= e discussions.

<= /div>
On Tue, Aug 18, 2026= at 4:09=E2=80=AFPM Songbo Bu <bluedognull= @gmail.com> wrote:
[SNIP]=C2=A0On cross-connection replay handling: I think we can agree on desired handl= ing in this draft and solutions can then implement this.=C2=A0

tiruma= l reddy <kondtir@= gmail.com> =E4=BA=8E2026=E5=B9=B48=E6=9C=8818=E6=97=A5=E5=91=A8=E4= =BA=8C 14:26=E5=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A

On cro= ss-connection replay: how a solution detects and handles it (abort or other= wise) is a separate discussion for the solution drafts, not this document.<= /p>

[NR]: As such, I agree with Tiru on the di= rection with this.
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