[Seat] Re: Comments on formal analysis of relay attacks in attested TLS (CVE-2026-33697)

Muhammad Usama Sardar <muhammad_usama.sardar@tu-dresden.de> Tue, 30 June 2026 20:12 UTC

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CC: Songbo Bu <bluedognull@gmail.com>, Nathanael Ritz <nathanritz@gmail.com>
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Subject: [Seat] Re: Comments on formal analysis of relay attacks in attested TLS (CVE-2026-33697)
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Hi Nathanael,

Thank you for your feedback.

We would like to clarify a couple of misunderstandings to avoid talking 
past each other:

 1. What you are proposing adding as conditions actually seems to
    translate to the assumption 'there exists *no connection in the
    world* that ever uses weak hashes, weak DH or bad element.' So your
    proposed property appears to be saying something like: /my/
    connection is secure if /every/ connection in the world is secure.
    If /every/ connection in the world is secure, then /my/ connection
    is secure too; so could you clarify the point of your proposed property?
 2. We believe you can agree that achieving a property *without
    additional assumptions* is stronger than achieving a property with
    the additional assumptions that /every/ connection in the world is
    secure. It's as simple as that.

Because of above reasons, we disagree with you.

In any case, Sec. 6.1 in the paper [0] is clear on the threat model, and 
for TLS, it is typical to consider weak hashes, weak DH, or bad element 
(e.g., as Sec. 6.1 clearly cites Bhargavan et al.'s foundational paper 
for TLS 1.3 [1]).

Also, please note that in ProVerif, variables that appear only after the 
arrow (==>) are existentially quantified.

Hope that helps.


On 28.06.26 22:32, Nathanael Ritz wrote:
> ## Regarding correlation goals (G3 => G2 => G1)

As presented in Sec. 6.4 in paper [0], this proof is paper-and-pen 
based, and not ProVerif based. Please clarify your concern precisely. 
Thank you!

> However, the models reveal that if a mechanism achieves "Level 1" (G1) 
> binding or higher (as seen in mechanisms #3, 5, 7, and the proposal), 
> correlation to "Level 2" (G2) and "Level 3" (G3) naturally follows 
> under the standard cryptographic assumptions of TLS 1.3.
Please see #1 and #2 above.

> ## Minimal demonstration under standard cryptographic assumptions
>
> In the current models, the G2 and G3 queries return false. However, 
> when queries are conditioned to exclude the model's own 
> weak-cryptography events, they return true.
Please see #1 and #2 above.

We welcome any /constructive/ technical feedback.

We would love to hear from the formal methods experts in UFMRG. We also 
warmly welcome future collaborators moving forward. Thank you!

Best regards,

Usama, Slava, and Jean-Marie

[0] 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/408219182_Intra-handshakefail_CVE-2026-33697_High-severity_CVE_in_Attested_TLS

[1] https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7958594/