Re: [secdir] SecDir review of draft-ietf-mpls-ldp-hello-crypto-auth-05

[Loa Andersson <[e-mail]>]

All,

Do I understand correctly if we are now OK to go ahead and have
this draft approved?

/Loa

On 2014-05-26 03:30, Vero Zheng wrote:
> Thanks Yaron and Manav for working this out.
>
> I have just confirmed the post.
>
> Cheers, Vero
>
> *From:*Manav Bhatia [mailto:[e-mail]]
> *Sent:* Sunday, May 25, 2014 1:50 PM
> *To:* Yaron Sheffer
> *Cc:* Uri Blumenthal; Stephen Farrell; Bhatia, Manav (Manav); IETF
> Security Directorate;
> [e-mail]; The IESG; Loa
> Andersson
> *Subject:* Re: [secdir] SecDir review of
> draft-ietf-mpls-ldp-hello-crypto-auth-05
>
> Hi,
>
> Yaron, I and few of us exchanged quite a few emails offline and we have
> come up with a version that addresses Yaron's and Stephen's concerns
> about repeating the HMAC stuff thats already present in RFC 2104. We've
> cleaned it up pretty nicely with very minimal changes.
>
> I am unable to submit this latest and the greatest version since i have
> updated my email ID in this version. The tracker requires one of the
> co-authors to authenticate/approve the submission.
>
> I am attaching the latest version with this email in case folks want to
> go through this till it becomes available formally.
>
> The draft is all set to fly now! :-)
>
> Cheers, Manav
>
> On Wed, May 21, 2014 at 7:54 PM, Yaron Sheffer <[e-mail]
> <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>
> IMHO, this is purely a naming problem. Apad does NOT modify the base
> HMAC, please see
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-mpls-ldp-hello-crypto-auth-05#section-5.
> It is just one more thing that's signed by HMAC.
>
> My problem with this draft is that they have different ideas about the
> key length, compared to RFC 2104 (top of Sec. 5.1). Also, I am unhappy
> that they spell out the HMAC construction instead of leaving it as a
> black box.
>
> But I think Apad is just fine, if it weren't for the unfortunate name
> that leads people to think it's modifying HMAC.
>
> Thanks,
>          Yaron
>
>
> On 05/21/2014 04:28 PM, Uri Blumenthal wrote:
>
>> Once again, please.
>>
>> 1. Who specifically, at NIST and at IESG, says that HMAC needs Apad for security reasons (and therefore is not secure as-is)?
>>
>> 2. What are those security reasons, and what are the attacks that are foiled by Apad?
>>
>> 3. What published papers/references/whatever is this documented? As HMAC came with security proofs, I’d like to see where and how they are invalidated (if they indeed are).
>>
>>
>>
>> On May 21, 2014, at 8:57 , Stephen Farrell <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 21/05/14 12:14, Bhatia, Manav (Manav) wrote:
>>>> I agree with Loa.
>>>>
>>>> Our current draft is very simple and has gone through multiple
>>>> iterations of reviews in at least two WGs. It brings LDP to the same
>>>> level of security as other protocols running in the networks.
>>>
>>> Fully agree with that goal.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> I think we should just push it forward and if there is an interest in
>>>> writing a new ID that updates HMAC specification, then we write one
>>>> that includes the Apad stuff. I think the latter should anyways be
>>>> done, regardless of what happens to this particular draft.
>>>
>>> I need to read it. But I'd be happier if that HMAC draft existed
>>> and was going to be processed - then we wouldn't have to do this
>>> discussion again.
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>> S.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> The IETF submission site is down and hence couldn’t upload the
>>>> revised ID (addressing Yaron's comments). Will do it tomorrow once
>>>> its up.
>>>>
>>>> After that its ready to be placed before the IESG.
>>>>
>>>> Cheers, Manav
>>>>
>>>>> -----Original Message----- From: Loa Andersson [mailto:[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>]
>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, May 21, 2014 4:29 PM To: Manav Bhatia; Stephen
>>>>> Farrell Cc: Bhatia, Manav (Manav); IETF Security Directorate; The
>>>>> IESG; [e-mail]
> <mailto:[e-mail]>;
>>>>> Yaron Sheffer Subject: Re: SecDir review of
>>>>> draft-ietf-mpls-ldp-hello-crypto-auth-05
>>>>>
>>>>> Folks,
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm only the document shepherd. My feeling is that we are raising
>>>>> the hurdle step by step for the KARP - initiated RFCs, the first
>>>>> was comparatively smooth, now we are trying to put an 18 months
>>>>> effort (individual draft to RFC) in front of approving something
>>>>> that is comparatively simple and seen as raising LDP to the same
>>>>> security as the other routing protocols.
>>>>>
>>>>> So if we get to tired to push this, we are all better off not
>>>>> doing the security work for this particular protocol?
>>>>>
>>>>> Someone said - "Never let the best be the enemy of the possible"!
>>>>>
>>>>> /Loa
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 2014-05-21 12:39, Manav Bhatia wrote:
>>>>>> Stephen,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This however is a long drawn discussion because everyone
>>>>>>>> needs to
>>>>> be
>>>>>>>> convinced on the merits of updating the HMAC specification --
>>>>>>>> which
>>>>> I
>>>>>>>> am not sure will take how long.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So I need to look at this draft, HMAC and the other cases but
>>>>>>> it seems to me that you're copying a page or two of crypto spec
>>>>>>> each time and changing one line. Doing that over and over is a
>>>>>>> recipe for long term pain, isn't it?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It sure is.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I had volunteered to write a 1-2 page long ID that updated the
>>>>>> HMAC
>>>>> to
>>>>>> include the Apad, but the idea was shot down. The only
>>>>>> alternative left was to include the crypto stuff in each standard
>>>>>> that we wrote later.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (And we've had this discussion for each such draft while I've
>>>>>>> been on the IESG I think, which is also somewhat drawn out;-)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This draft is probably the last one thats coming from the Routing
>>>>>> WG which will have this level of crypto mathematics spelled out.
>>>>>> All other IGPs are already covered. In case we need to change
>>>>>> something
>>>>> in
>>>>>> the ones already covered we can refer to the base RFC where we
>>>>>> have detailed the crypto maths. For example,
>>>>>> draft-ietf-ospf-security-extension-manual-keying-08 amongst
>>>>>> other things also updates the definition of Apad. It points to
>>>>>> the exact mathematics in RFC 5709 and only updates the Apad
>>>>>> definition in that draft. This draft btw has cleared the WG LC
>>>>>> and would be appearing before you guys very soon.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Given this, i think we should just pass this draft with this
>>>>>> level of details. Subsequently, when LDP wants to update
>>>>>> something, it can normatively refer to this RFC and only give the
>>>>>> changes.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Cheers, Manav
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> S.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Cheers, Manav
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> S
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Cheers, Manav
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- From: Stephen Farrell
>>>>>>>>>>> [mailto:[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>] Sent:
> Wednesday, May
>>>>>>>>>>> 21, 2014 2:53 AM To: Bhatia, Manav (Manav); IETF
>>>>>>>>>>> Security Directorate; The IESG; draft-
>>>>>>>>>>>[e-mail]
> <mailto:[e-mail]> Cc:
>>>>>>>>>>> Yaron Sheffer;[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]> Subject: Re:
>>>>>>>>>>> SecDir review of
>>>>>>>>>>> draft-ietf-mpls-ldp-hello-crypto-auth-05
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On 19/05/14 21:27, Yaron Sheffer wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * 5.1: Redefining HMAC (RFC 2104) is an extremely
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bad idea. This reviewer does not have the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> appropriate background to critique the proposed
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> solution, but there must be an overwhelming
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reason to
>>>>>>>>>>> reopen> >>>>> cryptographic primitives.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> This is a decision that was taken by Sec Ads when
>>>>>>>>>>>>> we were doing the crypto protection for the IGPs
>>>>>>>>>>>>> based on some feedback from NIST.
>>>>>>>>>>> This
>>>>>>>>>>>>> mathematics is not new and has been done for all
>>>>>>>>>>>>> IGPs and has been approved and rather encouraged by
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Security ADs.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The above does not sound like something I recognise. I
>>>>>>>>>>> have repeatedly asked that documents not re-define
>>>>>>>>>>> HMAC. Perhaps this time, I'll make that a DISCUSS and
>>>>>>>>>>> not budge. I probably should have done that before
>>>>>>>>>>> TBH.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> If you are revising that doc, *please* get rid of the
>>>>>>>>>>> re-definition and just properly refer to HMAC. Its
>>>>>>>>>>> about time to stop repeating that error.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> S.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Loa Andersson                        email:[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>>>> Senior MPLS [e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]> Huawei
>>>>> Technologies (consultant)     phone:[phone] <tel:%2B46%20739%2081%2021%2064>
>>>
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>>
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>

-- 


Loa Andersson                        email: [e-mail]
Senior MPLS Expert                          [e-mail]
Huawei Technologies (consultant)     phone: [phone]