Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-mip4-generic-notification-message-09

Hui Deng <> Tue, 08 September 2009 16:31 UTC

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Date: Wed, 09 Sep 2009 00:31:58 +0800
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From: Hui Deng <>
To: "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <>
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Subject: Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-mip4-generic-notification-message-09
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Dear Joseph Salowey

Thanks for ur kind help, the draft has been updated to version 11
based on ur major comments
reply inline.

2009/9/8 Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) <>:
>  have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
> ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.
> These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security
> area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat these
> comments just like any other last call comments.
> I have primarily focused on the security considerations section in this
> document.  I also quickly reviewed the rest of the document.  Based on
> my review I have the following comments:
> 1. In section 4.1, Identification
> It states "nonces" are optional.  Nonces are not mentioned in the rest
> of the document.  This option should be removed.
based on mip4's discussion, nonces section has been updated

> 2. Section 4.1, extensions
> I found this section confusing as to when the AE is required.  It seems
> the document states that the AE is always required, however it also uses
> optional.   For example its not clear to me what is required in the case
> given is section 3.2.
clarify by indicate which AE is mandate and which AE will be optional

> 3. Section 4.2, extensions
> Shouldn't the AE be required for GNAM?

> 4. Security considerations Section 8
> It also wasn't quite clear to me when the AE is optional and mandatory.
Updated in Message sections.

> 5. Section 8.1
> There are several places in the document where different replay
> mechanisms are alluded to, included this section.  This section states
> that nodes must agree on the mechanism used.  However there appears to
> be no way to signal what mechanism is in use.  Is this assumed to be
> pre-configured in each node, or is there another mechanism for this?  Is
> this realistic for deployments?
signal will be mobility security assocation as defined by the
mobility security association between them, and SPI value
in the authorization-enabling extension

> 6. Section 8.1.1
> NTP RFC 1305 needs to be included in the normative references.

> Why is it important "those bits which are not available from a time
> source SHOULD be generated from a good source of randomness" ? (it seems
> that you don't really want bits to be random since you want to enforce
> ordering)
remove this

> This section also talks very briefly about clock synchronization.  It
> seems there could be security implications here.  One node may be able
> to poison a clock to an in appropriate value.  There probably should be
> more discussion here.
if poison, will discard it

> 7. Section 8.2
> This section makes a statement but does not describe how impacts the
> security of the system.  Since authentication is not performed can you
> use the extension defined in the document in this case?  What is the
> effect of the lack of authentication.

thanks again.
Best regards,