Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-trill-rbridge-protocol-14

Donald Eastlake <d3e3e3@gmail.com> Mon, 11 January 2010 11:46 UTC

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Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2010 06:46:25 -0500
Message-ID: <1028365c1001110346q539ce61ag9515e27d27cb1322@mail.gmail.com>
From: Donald Eastlake <d3e3e3@gmail.com>
To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
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Cc: Silvano Gai <sgai@cisco.com>, secdir@ietf.org, Erik Nordmark <erik.nordmark@sun.com>, Dinesh Dutt <ddutt@cisco.com>, Anoop Ghanwani <anoop@brocade.com>, Radia Perlman <Radia.Perlman@sun.com>, iesg@ietf.org, Ralph Droms <rdroms@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-trill-rbridge-protocol-14
Precedence: list

Thanks for the review,
Donald
=============================
Donald E. Eastlake 3rd   +1-508-634-2066 (home)
155 Beaver Street
Milford, MA 01757 USA
d3e3e3@gmail.com


On Sun, Jan 10, 2010 at 6:28 PM, Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>wrote:

>  I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
> ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.
>  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area
> directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just
> like any other last call comments.
>
> I have limited my review to security related issues and whether the
> document have a reasonable security considerations section.
> I have not reviewed the technical content of the document.
>
> The document seems sound form a security perspective. The security
> considerations section is clear on the fact layer 2 bridging is not
> inherently secure but appears to make a reasonable job at describing
> guidance on how to address various security issues related to this protocol.
>
> I find no major issues that the security ADs should be aware of.
>
> /Stefan
>

[secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-trill-rbridg… Stefan Santesson
Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-trill-rb… Donald Eastlake