[secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-sidrops-rpkimaxlen-12

Sean Turner via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Tue, 09 August 2022 14:47 UTC

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From: Sean Turner via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org>
To: secdir@ietf.org
Cc: draft-ietf-sidrops-rpkimaxlen.all@ietf.org, last-call@ietf.org, sidrops@ietf.org
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Reply-To: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
Date: Tue, 09 Aug 2022 07:47:45 -0700
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/1xRWKi_Qfh74X_ExlYj-6yzCRRU>
Subject: [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-sidrops-rpkimaxlen-12

Reviewer: Sean Turner
Review result: Ready

Hi! I know a little about RPKI, but do not operate a network so I am in
theoretical land here. I also reviewed the mail list traffic related to this
I-D.

Since this is an I-D and I'm supposed to comment, I wracked my brain and came
up with nothing security-related. To me, it seems that the recommendation to
configure your ROAs so that they align exactly with your BGP announcements
seems pretty reasonable. Obviously, the more you tighten the screws the more
operation impacts there are, but the I-D addresses some of those impacts.

[secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-si… Sean Turner via Datatracker
Re: [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-iet… Ben Maddison