Re: [secdir] New Routing Area Security Design Team

Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> Sat, 21 April 2018 02:36 UTC

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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Date: Fri, 20 Apr 2018 22:36:27 -0400
Cc: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>, secdir <secdir@ietf.org>, Russ White <russ@riw.us>, Stewart Bryant <stewart.bryant@gmail.com>, "Acee Lindem (acee)" <acee@cisco.com>, "BRUNGARD, DEBORAH A" <db3546@att.com>
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To: Jeffrey Haas <jhaas@pfrc.org>
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Subject: Re: [secdir] New Routing Area Security Design Team
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Having tried to help* the last time the routing and security got together, I can’t help but suggest that with this:

> On Apr 15, 2018, at 15:27, Jeffrey Haas <jhaas@pfrc.org> wrote:
> 
> 
>> On Apr 15, 2018, at 2:04 PM, Russ White <russ@riw.us> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>>> As Richard said, the headline issue for outsiders like me is BGP hijacking,
>>> whether as a mean to hijack addresses and inject spam, or as a way to
>> 
>> This is more about documenting how routing folks should build their security considerations sections to reduce the friction between the security area and the routing area. A much more prosaic situation, I know... 😊
> 
> ^This.

and this:

> On Apr 16, 2018, at 10:28, Jeffrey Haas <jhaas@pfrc.org> wrote:
> 
> 
>> How about "Better Routing Application Transport Security (BRATS)"?  ;)
> 
> Only if we get our own line of dolls.

that maybe a better name is:

PEDICURE	PixiE Dust routIng seCURity considErations

Because, it sounds like that’s where we’ll be looking ;)  A nice side effect of this effort is that routing drafts can start to skip secdir reviews after this is done because whatever this group comes up with is going to get copied everywhere; it’ll be like MIB security considerations!  I assume that’s really the short term plan right?

I’m trying to not be too much of downer here, but the last time security helped there was a lot of: you don’t understand how these protocols are used/deployed, key management is too onerous, and whoa that’s too heavy weight/gold plated.  Since the last time around security still doesn’t come for free and pretty much every security protocol still requires some type of key management … so what’s going to be different this time around?  I.e., why would one want to volunteer to help one of these to be formed small teams?

spt

* for some value of help.