Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-jose-jws-signing-input-options-06

[Kathleen Moriarty <[e-mail]>]

Mike,

Please do add that to the abstract and post as soon as you can with
all updates from last call received so far and agreed upon.

Thanks,
Kathleen

On Sat, Dec 12, 2015 at 10:30 PM, Mike Jones
<[e-mail]> wrote:
> Sounds good.  Thanks, Kathleen.
>
>                                 -- Mike
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Kathleen Moriarty [mailto:[e-mail]]
> Sent: Saturday, December 12, 2015 7:28 PM
> To: Mike Jones <[e-mail]>
> Cc: Benjamin Kaduk <[e-mail]>; [e-mail]; [e-mail]; [e-mail]
> Subject: Re: secdir review of draft-ietf-jose-jws-signing-input-options-06
>
>
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
>> On Dec 12, 2015, at 9:33 PM, Mike Jones <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Ben,
>>
>> Thanks for the useful review.  Replies are inline below...
>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: Benjamin Kaduk [mailto:[e-mail]]
>>> Sent: Friday, December 11, 2015 10:05 AM
>>> To: [e-mail]; [e-mail];
>>> draft-ietf-jose-jws-signing-input-
>>> [e-mail]
>>> Subject: secdir review of
>>> draft-ietf-jose-jws-signing-input-options-06
>>>
>>> Hi all,
>>>
>>> I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
>>> ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
>>> IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
>>> security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat
>>> these comments just like any other last call comments.
>>>
>>> This document is Ready.
>>>
>>> The main JWS spec (RFC 7515) required that the signed payload was
>>> base64url-encoded prior to signing.  This results in a noticeable
>>> size expansion; in some circumstances it is desirable to avoid this
>>> expansion and reencoding.  I did not follow the JWS document closely
>>> at the time, but I believe this issue was raised at the time and
>>> consensus reached on the published version because it is always safe for applications to use.
>>> This document provides an opt-in mechanism for application
>>> (protocol)s to avoid the extra encoding and expansion, leaving the
>>> burden on the application to determine whether it is safe to do so
>>> and perform the relevant input checking/sanitization.  The security
>>> considerations correctly describe the implications of the loss of
>>> encoding and the restrictions on the signed content when detached
>>> payloads are not used, interoperability concerns for applications not
>>> supporting the b64 header parameter, and proposes appropriate countermeasures.
>>
>> Thanks for letting us know that the security considerations were clear.
>>
>>> Interestingly, this document does not need to update the JWS spec,
>>> since it is just adding to an IANA registry and not modifying the
>>> core spec, but it does update the JWT spec (RFC 7519) to prohibit the
>>> use of b64=false in JWTs.  No justification is made for this
>>> restriction in the text of the document, but it seems reasonable to "play it safe" in this sense, to me.
>>
>> The restriction is there for interoperability reasons.  I added the phrase "For interoperability reasons" to my working copy of the document so this reason is stated.
>>
>>> I do have a few nits unrelated to the security review:
>>>
>>> The abstract mentions the "Updates: 7519", but the introduction does
>>> not; I am sometimes told that both locations should mention the
>>> update, but I assume that the RFC Editor will notice if anything needs to change.
>>
>> The restriction is listed (and now motivated!) in the "Intended Use by Applications" section.  That being said, if the RFC editor wants it repeated elsewhere, that would be fine.
>>
> I think Ben is correct on this.  I'll check tomorrow and get back to you donut can be included in your update to save ADs time during their reviews.
>
> Thanks for the review Ben!
>
> Kathleen
>>> It is a bit amusing that the example with payload "$.02" is actually
>>> longer with the unencoded payload, due to the overhead of the header
>>> field, but I do not suggest modifying the example at this time.
>>
>> Yep - that is amusing.  I hadn't realized that, but it makes sense.
>>
>>> Section 5.3 makes reference to Section 8.3 of RFC 7159 for JSON
>>> string-escape processing, but I think perhaps section 7 of that RFC
>>> would be a better reference.
>>
>> The language you're referring to is actually directly copied from Section 5.3 of JWS [RFC 7519] because it's intended to have exactly the same meaning.  For consistency reasons between this spec and JWS, I'm reluctant to change the reference, even though I understand your point.
>>
>>> Relatedly, I needed to reread the text in Section 5.3 a few times in
>>> order to convince myself that I correctly understood the procedure
>>> for generating the payload to be signed, but I believe that all the
>>> steps given are necessary and correct, and do not have proposed text
>>> that would be better.  String-escape processing is just inherently fiddly.
>>
>> Again, because this language is from an already approved RFC and since you believe it is correct, I'm reluctant to fiddle with it.
>>
>>> I did not attempt to verify the examples' encoding and consistency.
>>
>> Others have done so (and are thanked in the Acknowledgements).
>>
>>> Thanks for this well-written document.
>>
>> Thanks for the useful review!  Unless I hear objections to these resolutions and those to Robert's Gen-ART review, I'll plan to publish the updated document shortly.
>>
>>> -Ben
>>
>>                Best wishes,
>>                -- Mike
>>



-- 

Best regards,
Kathleen