Re: [secdir] Review of draft-ietf-pce-lsp-control-request-07

Mahend Negi <mahend.ietf@gmail.com> Sun, 25 August 2019 17:13 UTC

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From: Mahend Negi <mahend.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 25 Aug 2019 22:42:53 +0530
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To: shawn.emery@gmail.com, semery@uccs.edu
Cc: secdir <secdir@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-pce-lsp-control-request.all@ietf.org, pce@ietf.org, Dhruv Dhody <dhruv.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [secdir] Review of draft-ietf-pce-lsp-control-request-07
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Hi Shawn/Dhruv,

Thanks for the review and clarifications, we have fixed all the editorial
comments in new version.

New Version:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-pce-lsp-control-request-08

Version Diff:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-pce-lsp-control-request-08

Regards,
Mahendra


On Tue, Aug 20, 2019 at 11:14 AM Dhruv Dhody <dhruv.ietf@gmail.com>; wrote:

> Hi Shawn,
>
> <adding WG>
>
> Thanks for your security review and comments.
>
> On Mon, Aug 19, 2019 at 6:17 AM Shawn Emery <shawn.emery@gmail.com>; wrote:
> >
> > Reviewer: Shawn M. Emery
> > Review result: Ready
> >
> > I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
> > ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.
> > These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security
> > area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these
> > comments just like any other last call comments.
> >
> > This draft specifies an extension to the Path Computation Element
> communication
> > Protocol (PCE) that allows a PCE to request control of Label Switched
> Paths (LSPs).
> >
> > The security considerations section does exist and discusses a new DoS
> vector
> > that this draft creates.  The attack involves sending control requests
> for delegate
> > control of all of its LSPs to the Path Computation Client (PCC).  The
> proposed
> > solution is to set a threshold rate of the delegation requests for the
> PCC per PCE.
> > I agree with the proposed solution, though I don't know if guidance can
> be provided
> > on what these thresholds would be per environment.
> >
>
> As you noted the document does not provide default for the threshold
> as it dependent on the deployment/environment. The same is true for
> RFC 8231.
>
> > The section goes on to refer to RFC 8231 to justify that the PCP
> extension should
> > be deployed with authenticated and encrypted sessions in TLS using RFC
> 8253.
> > I agree with this prescription as well else an attacker would now be
> able to take
> > control over all local LSPs with this extension.  I think that this
> should at least be
> > stated if an attacker is able to compromise a PCE.
> >
>
> The security consideration includes "...either by spoofing messages or
> by compromising the PCE itself".
>
> > General comments:
> >
> > None.
> >
> > Editorial comments:
> >
> > s/sends PCRpt/sends a PCRpt/
> > s/also specify/also specifies/
> > s/all its/all of its/
> > s/If threshold/If the threshold/
> > s/explicitly set aside/explicitly excluded/
> >
>
> Thanks for these, request authors to handle them.
>
> Thanks!
> Dhruv
>
> > Shawn.
> > --
>