Re: [secdir] [Anima] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-16

Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> Tue, 02 October 2018 19:10 UTC

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From: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Oct 2018 15:10:07 -0400
Message-ID: <CAPt1N1mnps23VNjpjH41jiyOzs+N-fWLR3rJ33KZZsFuThDsMg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
Cc: Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>, Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>, Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>, Security Directorate <secdir@ietf.org>, anima@ietf.org, draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra.all@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [secdir] [Anima] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-16
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The problem is that possibly billions of devices will be bricked and
landfilled before this becomes the norm.

On Tue, Oct 2, 2018 at 3:05 PM Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>;
wrote:

>
> Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>; wrote:
>     > The manufacturer-going-out-of-business use case argues for there
> being
>     > a way that a person with physical access to the unit can re-key it
>     > without contacting the manufacturer. It also argues for open source,
>     > but that's out of scope. :)
>
> The authors think that having the box rekeyed is a feature that some
> manufacturers will provide, and some buyers will **insist** upon.
>
> It has to be difficult, and in some cases, physical access may be too
> insecure!
>
> It's not much different than handing an (sometimes encrypted)
> QIC-tape/CD/DVD
> containing source code over to an escrow lawyer, something I've regularly
> done when I've worked on products with proprietary stacks.
> We will see such things being discussed when we do the security review for
> SUIT as well.
>
> Being able to replace the manufacturer trust anchors for firmware, and the
> trust anchor for validating ownership vouchers will become a checkmark
> feature.  Any company can become Nortel.
>
>
> --
> Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>;, Sandelman Software Works
>  -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-
>
>
>
>