Re: [secdir] Security review of draft-ietf-oauth-token-exchange-14

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Fri, 10 August 2018 21:26 UTC

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Date: Fri, 10 Aug 2018 16:26:45 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Cc: hilarie@purplestreak.com, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, secdir@ietf.org, draft-ietf-oauth-token-exchange.all@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [secdir] Security review of draft-ietf-oauth-token-exchange-14
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On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 01:36:11PM -0600, Brian Campbell wrote:
> Hi Hilarie and thank you for the review.
> 
> In looking again at the example in section 4.1 about nested Actor Claims I
> agree that the scenario depicted by the example is confusing and rather
> unrealistic. I'll endeavor to produce a better example in the next revision
> of the draft.  I think perhaps showing a chain of delegation where the
> actors are different systems rather than mixing users and systems would be
> more straightforward.
> 
> So to be totally forthright, the Privacy Considerations section was written
> in response to a single but persistent mailing list commenter who was
> objecting to this (and other drafts for that matter) on the grounds that
> details of services being accessed and personal information may be revealed
> to the entities involved. But as you've noted, that's kinda fundamental to
> how this stuff works - the token is obtained and sent in order to access
> the resource. The Privacy Considerations text was basically just a
> compromise noting that the concerns had been heard but so the draft could
> move forward. Like many compromises, I don't know that anyone was
> particularly happy with this one. I don't think the text really adds any
> value - would simply removing it close that can of worms? Or would perhaps
> incorporating some text similar to what's in
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7523#section-7 be helpful here? I honestly
> don't know that much more concrete can be said about it. But I'm certainly
> open to suggestions, should you have them.

With the disclaimer that I haven't read token-exchange recently and am
mostly going off my memory of the mailing list discussions, it seems like
the key consideration here is that token exchange allows you to convert a
token that may be opaque to you into one that has inspectable fields, and
those fields can be privacy sensitive.  So a JWT response should only be
given to a requestor that trusted to know such information; a lot of the
time, that has large overlap with being trusted to have the token in the
first place, but potentially there is some amount of non-overlap.

The considerations from 7523 of course also apply, and sensitive
information should not be sent over unencrypted channels, but isn't the
above paragraph an aspect inherently new to token exchange?

-Benjamin

> Thanks,
> Brian
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
> > From: Hilarie Orman <hilarie@purplestreak.com>
> > Date: Wed, Aug 8, 2018 at 1:47 AM
> > Subject: Security review of draft-ietf-oauth-token-exchange-14
> > To: <iesg@ietf.org>rg>, <secdir@ietf.org>
> > Cc: <draft-ietf-oauth-token-exchange.all@ietf.org>
> >
> >
> > Security review of draft-ietf-oauth-token-exchange-14
> > OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange
> >
> > I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
> > ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.
> > These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area
> > directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments
> > just like any other last call comments.
> >
> > The abstract states:
> >    This specification defines a protocol for an HTTP- and JSON- based
> >    Security Token Service (STS) by defining how to request and obtain
> >    security tokens from OAuth 2.0 authorization servers, including
> >    security tokens employing impersonation and delegation.
> >
> > [This review is late because I mistook the due date,
> > dd-mm-yyyy = 06-08-2018
> > for
> > mm-dd-yyyy = 06-08-2018
> > and ignored the mm because obviously it is August and just focused on
> > the day.  Which goes to show that it is important to understand what
> > a message means.]
> >
> > I'm not at all sure I understand what the various fields in the new
> > OAuth 2.0 tokens really mean.  For example, section 4.1 about Actor
> > Claims says that a web application might receive a token expressing
> > that subject "admin" is acting for subject "user".  The web
> > application could "exchange" that token for a new one showing itself
> > as the actor for "user".  As a "chain of delegation", this is
> > confusing.  It would seem that the original token could be used to
> > access resources, and the "exchange" of one token for another is not
> > necessary.
> >
> > The complications of delegation and "impersonation" and "may act for"
> > aside, section 7 (Privacy) seems to open a can of worms.  Tokens may
> > "reveal details of the target services" and thus may give away
> > information about what the subject is doing or intends to do.  But the
> > subject must send the token in order to access the resource.  What is
> > a rational privacy policy for Oauth tokens?  Will clients find it
> > expedient to include all their tokens in every request?  How does a
> > client know which tokens a server can be trusted with?  The document
> > suggests that the tokens should only be communicated according to the
> > privacy policies of the "respective organizations".  How do two
> > organizations communicate their privacy policies to one another?
> > This section needs some amplification.
> >
> > The document is well-written, but the subject is complex.
> >
> > Hilarie
> >
> >
> 
> -- 
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