[secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-isis-pcr

"Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com> Thu, 07 January 2016 14:31 UTC

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: "iesg@ietf.org" <iesg@ietf.org>, "secdir@ietf.org" <secdir@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-isis-pcr.all@tools.ietf.org" <draft-ietf-isis-pcr.all@tools.ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Secdir review of draft-ietf-isis-pcr
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Date: Thu, 7 Jan 2016 14:31:33 +0000
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Subject: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-isis-pcr
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I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments.

My view: Ready with issues, about the security considerations section.

I know very little about IS-IS, or even the overall routing discipline.

One nit is that this document cannot easily be read stand-alone.  That is probably okay, but a pointer to background RFC's are a definition of terms (e.g., sub-TLV) would be helpful.

I do not understand how "reserving capacity" or "specifying capacity" cannot be used as a denial of service attack.  Perhaps that is related to the above paragraph?  Is there authentication (perhaps out of band) between IS-IS systems?  Message integrity that prevents spoofing or modification?